Wednesday, April 13, 2011

Why the world should keep an eye on Djibouti

Baobab

WITH the world's Africa-watchers distracted by bloody events in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, and elections in giant and chaotic Nigeria, it's easy to forget about a presidential election in Djibouti. The tiny state in the Horn of Africa, wedged between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, has only 860,000 inhabitants. But Djibouti's importance is underscored by the presence of 5,000 or so French and American troops, a legacy of its status as a former French colony (it won independence in 1977) and a current western ally in the wars against terror and piracy.

Results from the election on April 8th were swift and predictable: President Ismail Guelleh of the People's Rally for Progress, who has ruled since 1999 (when he took over from his uncle), was re-elected by a landslide. According to Djibouti's electoral commission, around 80% of the votes were cast for Mr Guelleh, slightly down on the 100% he officially achieved in 2005. Turnout was also reported as high, with 70% of the 150,000 registered turning up to vote. Polling day itself was, according to most accounts, a serene affair by sub-Saharan African standards.

Closer examination reveals a less serene picture. Mr Guelleh's victory came in the face of weak opposition with only one candidate, an independent, standing against him. Last year, he forced through constitutional changes to allow himself a third six-year term in office. Opposition groups had called for a boycott of the election after the suppression in February of Middle-East-inspired protests, partly provoked Djibouti's high rate of unemployment, in which two people were killed. In early March, the president kicked a team of international election observers out of the country.

All sad, but should the world worry? Despotic behaviour is hardly unusual in Djibouti's neighbourhood. But as the presence of all those troops suggests, it should. Aly Verjee, one of the observers evicted in March, spells it out in an article in Foreign Policy:

Djibouti matters. It matters a lot. As the forward operating base of U.S. Africa Command, Djibouti's Camp Lemonnier is a friendly piece of real estate in the Horn of Africa, which includes Eritrea, Somalia, and Yemen. Approximately 2,000 U.S. troops are based at Lemonnier, in addition to the naval forces that periodically call at the port of Djibouti. With the nearest friendly African port located in Mombasa, Kenya—1,700 miles away—the United States, NATO, and the European Union have no alternative to using Djibouti's harbor as a sanctuary to conduct anti-piracy operations. 

Its unfettered cooperation on anti-piracy operations has endeared Djibouti to many other members of the international community. A score of countries—including Japan, Germany, and Russia—rely on the port of Djibouti to sustain their naval presence in East African waters. At the mouth of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti is strategically located to protect some of the world's busiest shipping lanes, which have become increasingly vulnerable to ever more ambitious pirates. And the problem is not going away.  Despite some success in disrupting "pirate action groups," as they are termed by the multinational forces, 14 ships have already been hijacked in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean this year, according to figures from the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center.

As the only US military toehold on the continent, Djibouti is also a vital link in the war on terror.  Unmanned anti-terrorism drones are deployed from Lemonnier against targets in the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia.

With the likes of Human Rights Watch lining up to condemn Mr Guelleh, and after the collapse of friendly regimes in the Middle East, the West may want to take a bit more interest in the actions of one of its few allies in a no less volatile and equally vital region further south too. 

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Thinking Small

SSIR Opinion & Analysis

This is spring conference season in philanthropy, filled with such events as Skoll World Forum, the Council on Foundations annual conference and the Global Philanthropy Forum (streaming live). At all of these conferences, there will be an invocation to dream big, to think big, to set audacious goals, and to reach for the stars—to believe in the power of social entrepreneurs, or foundations, or grassroots communities, or individuals to change the world.

Grand plans and expansive visions will be the order of the day.

I think we'd get a lot more value from these conferences if they encouraged people to think small.

Recently I've been reading bits and pieces of Jane Jacobs' classic, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, and I stumbled across this: "The trouble with paternalists is that they want to make impossibly profound changes, and they choose impossibly superficial means for doing so." I had a moment of depression thinking of how apropos that sentence is today—especially during conference season—even though it was written almost 40 years ago.

And it is apropos. A similar thought was powerfully expressed by Kathryn Schulz, in a terrific essay in New York Magazine about the spate of "Big Idea" books that have come to dominate the nonfiction shelves: "Solutions are not one size fits all; they are in fact, maddeningly bespoke. That's because neither problems nor people are fungible."

The problem with big dreams and big visions and "changing the world" is that it almost necessarily involves assuming that problems and people are fungible, and invoking impossibly superficial means to address these oversimplified problems.

This isn't a cynical argument that change is impossible (it's another way of advocating for patient optimists) and we should throw up our hands. It's an argument that big changes don't come from thinking big, but from thinking small. That by the way is one of the core themes of Abhijit Banerjee's and Esther Duflo's new book Poor Economics, which I highly recommend. In closing their book, they offer some succinct advice of the type that I wish was more on display during conference season:

  1. Resist lazy, formulaic thinking that reduces people and problems to the same set of general observations and principles.
  2. Listen to people and force yourself to understand the logic of their choices.
  3. Subject every idea, no matter how commonsensical, to rigorous testing.

The next time you're urged to "think big," give thinking small a try. The world will be better for it.


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Tim Ogden is Executive Partner at Sona Partners, a thought leadership communications firm. He has edited 4 books on the intersection of business strategy and technology published by Harvard Business School Press and co-authored or ghostwritten several articles for Harvard Business Review. He is frequently quoted in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and Financial Times.  You can follow him on Twitter: @philaction or @timothyogden.

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Knapen respecteert wens vanuit Eerste Kamer

Vice Versa - vakblad over ontwikkelingssamenwerking

Staatssecretaris Knapen van Buitenlandse Zaken zal zich in 2012 over de begroting buigen om te kijken wat er mogelijk is voor MFS-II. Deze toezegging deed hij gisteravond tijdens het Algemeen Overleg over de Wereldbank en het IMF.

Eerder die dag was er door de Eerste Kamer een motie aangenomen waarin de staatssecretaris opgroepen wordt de 50 miljoen euro bezuinigingen op MFS-II ongedaan te maken. Knapen liet tijdens het Algemeen Overleg weten de wensen die er in beide Kamers bestaan, te respecteren.

Het Algemeen Overleg vond plaats aan de vooravond van de jaarlijkse spring meetings van het IMF en de Wereldbank in Washington op 16 en 17 april, waar de ministers (of in het geval van Nederland de staatssecretarissen) van Financiën en Buitenlandse Zaken bij elkaar komen. Tijdens deze vergadering wordt onder meer overlegd over de zestiende middelenaanvulling aan het IDA-fonds. Dit fonds verstrekt rentevrije, lange-termijn leningen aan de 79 armste landen ter wereld. Iedere drie jaar worden de fondsen aangevuld. Een land is verplicht hun beloofde bedragen over een periode van negen jaar betalen, maar Nederland voldoet haar verplichtingen meestal in zes jaar.

IDA-16 en het maatschappelijk middenveld

Enkele Kamerleden aasden erop geld uit het IDA-fonds over te hevelen naar het maatschappelijk middenveld. Knapen zei echter dat er voor dit jaar geen kasschuiven meer mogelijk zouden zijn voor IDA, omdat de betalingen al zover zouden zijn uitgerekt als mogelijk was. De betalingen voor IDA-14 en IDA-15 hadden echter wel degelijk nog verspreid kunnen worden over de komende jaren, als Nederland zich zou houden aan de verplichte betalingstermijn van negen jaar in plaats van de bedragen in zes jaar te willen aflossen. Overigens is de regering voornemens de betalingen aan IDA-16, die vanaf 2012 zullen beginnen, wel in negen jaar te voldoen en lijkt daarmee af te wijken van de termijn van zes jaar die ze gewoonlijk hanteerde.

Het bedrag dat Nederland heeft toegezegd voor het IDA-16 fonds, valt fors hoger uit dan IDA-15: 727 miljoen ten opzichte van 584 miljoen voor IDA-15. De oppositie, met name Ewout Irrgang (SP), kon dit hoge bedrag moeilijk verkroppen, te meer omdat op het maatschappelijk middenveld flink bezuinigd wordt. Knapen wist deze kritiek behendig te pareren door erop te wijzen dat de bedragen aan andere multilatere instellingen, zoals het UNDP, Unicef en het Global Funds en flink waren verlaagd, en dat er ngo's zijn die er in het kader van MFS-II er behoorlijk op vooruitgaan.

'Good value for money'

Volgens Knapen is het IDA-fonds van de Wereldbank daarnaast 'good value for money'. De Wereldbank heeft volgens hem een sleutelpositie in de internationale hulparchitectuur, is effectief in ontwikkelingssamenwerking en de prominente plaats dat de thema's voedselzekerheid en fragiele staten innemen, past bij de speerpunten van het Nederlands beleid.

Opvallend is dat uitgerekend de rol van de Wereldbank als het gaat om het inspelen op conflictsituaties,  weinig effectief is geweest. Dit wordt geconcludeerd in het World Development report van 2011, dat twee dagen geleden uit is gekomen. Volgens Irrgang is bovendien het beleid van de Wereldbank op het gebied van klimaatverandering en armoedebestrijding, weinig effectief.

Invloed 'kopen'?

Verwarring was al eerder ontstaan over de koppeling tussen de hoge geldelijke bijdrage van Nederland aan IDA-16 en de wens om invloed te hebben op de besluiten van de Wereldbank. Tijdens het Wetgevingsoverleg van 6 december had Knapen aangegeven dat de verhoging van de Nederlandse bijdrage niet voortkomt uit de wens mee te praten, maar dat het geld voor IDA-16 simpelweg welbesteed geld is. Tegelijkertijd beaamde hij dat de geldelijke bijdrage wel degelijk meetelde in de wens 'een stem behouden'. Arjan el Fassed (Groenlinks) wilde gisteravond van de staatssecretaris een concreet voorbeeld weten van zaken waarop Nederland in het verleden invloed had uitgeoefend. Knapen wist hierop te antwoorden dat Nederland een succesvolle lobby had gevoerd voor de onderwerpen gender en Seksuele en Reproductie Gezondheid en Rechten.

Toch moest Knapen toegeven dat Nederland niet veel zicht had op de verdeling van de gelden bestemd voor begrotingssteun, nadat er kritische vragen kwamen van PvdA Tweede Kamerlid Sjoera Dikkers en SP'er Irrgang, die erop wezen dat de Nigeria en Pakistan – in de ogen van de SP-woordvoerder corrupte landen – grote bedragen van de Wereldbank ontvingen.

Gered door de klok?

Ook over het gebrek aan transparantie van de Wereldbank waren de Kamerleden kritisch. De staatssecretaris gaf toe dat op dit punt nog het een en ander te verbeteren is en wil ook aandringen op verbeterde transparantie. Volgens hem is de Wereldbank een 'klassieke'  instelling, maar van goede wil en moet het de ruimte gegeven worden om veranderingen stap voor stap door te voeren.

Tegen half acht had Knapen nog niet op alle kritische vragen van de Kamerleden een gedegen antwoord gegeven. Werd hij gered door de klok of waren de Kamerleden simpelweg gauw tevreden? De staatssecretaris kwam er in ieder geval goed vanaf. Zo hoefde hij geen uitgebreid antwoord te geven op de vraag van Irrgang waarom de top van de Wereldbank meer dan 350 miljoen dollar per jaar verdient.

Aankomend weekend zal de staatssecretaris afreizen naar de spring meetings in Washington. Hij zal zich daar onder andere inzetten voor meer transparantie, voedselzekerheid (met name op het gebied van prijsschokken op de wereldmarkt) en zich kritisch opstellen ten opzichte van begrotingssteun naar corrupte landen.

Lees ook: Nederland en de Wereldbank

 

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Landenselectie Knapen: willekeur troef?

Vice Versa - vakblad over ontwikkelingssamenwerking

Op vrijdag 18 maart vond er een, voorlopig stille, revolutie plaats binnen het Nederlandse OS-beleid: de reductie van het aantal partnerlanden van de Nederlandse bilaterale ontwikkelingssamenwerking van 33 naar 15. De formele selectiecriteria gebruiken we hier als uitgangspunt voor een vergelijking tussen de 15 geselecteerde en 18 niet-geselecteerde landen. Op deze manier hopen wij een bijdrage te kunnen leveren aan de te voeren discussie over dit cruciale onderdeel van de Nederlandse OS.

Door: Lau Schulpen, Rik Habraken en Luuk van Kempen (CIDIN)

Landen vergeleken

In de selectie van de landen spelen zes (groepen van) criteria een cruciale rol (zie bijlage 1 Focusbrief). Vijf van deze hebben betrekking op het ontwikkelingsland zelf terwijl het zesde verwijst naar het economische of (regio-nale) veiligheidsbelang van het land. Anders gezegd: de eerste vijf verwijzen naar needs of merit motieven en het zesde naar self-interest motieven.

Geen van de vijf needs-elementen kan op zichzelf van doorslaggevend belang zijn geweest in de selectie om de simpele reden dat geselecteerde en niet-geselecteerde landen willekeurig scoren. Figuren 1 en 2 geven dat weer voor de hulp per capita en ease of doing business. Hieruit blijkt dat zowel landen zijn gekozen met veel hulp (donor darlings) als landen met weinig hulp (donor orphans). Ook zijn zowel landen gekozen met een lage en een hoge rank op de ease of doing business ranglijst. Soortgelijke figuren, met een vergelijkbare spreiding, zijn te maken voor de bestuurssituatie en de bijdrage aan de eigen ontwikkeling via belastingheffing.

Figuur 1. Netto ODA per capita (EU-donoren – 2000-2009)

Figuur 2. Ease of doing business (rank 2010)

Noot: een hogere rank betekent een slechtere score.

Het belang-criterium is het enige waar de redenering in dezelfde richting wijst. Dat is ook logisch: anders waren ze wel afgevallen. Dat belang kent tegelijk wel een brede interpretatie. Zo zijn Mali en Afghanistan van belang 'vanuit [internationaal of regionaal] veiligheidsperspectief', Mozambique en Ghana vooral vanuit een (Nederlands) 'economische perspectief' en Indonesië vanwege een 'brede belangstelling in Nederland'. Hier wreekt zich het ontbreken van een redenering voor de niet-geselecteerde landen. Is Jemen vanuit een veiligheidsperspectief nou echt zoveel belangrijker dan Egypte?

Groepen van landen vergeleken

Naast een vergelijking tussen individuele landen is het ook mogelijk om de groep van 15 partnerlanden af te zetten tegen de groep van 18 afvallers. Ook hier vormen de gehanteerde criteria het uitgangspunt (zie tabel 1).

Op veel terreinen verschillen de geselecteerde en niet-geselecteerde landen als groep niet van elkaar.1 Dat geldt vooral voor de needs-indicatoren met uitzondering van de HDI waarde. Daar hebben de 15 partnerlanden een lagere waarde dan de 18 niet-geselecteerde. Op het vlak van governance is opvallend dat de 15 landen een slechtere controle op corruptie hebben, maar een betere rechtsstatelijke ontwikkeling.

Tabel 1. Verschillen?

De grootste verschillen zijn te constateren op het economische terrein. De 15 landen ontvangen minder buitenlandse investeringen, maar meer remittances. Hun wetgeving op het gebied van de private sector is bovendien positiever en ze kennen een snellere groei van het BNP.

Het belang van centrale thema's

De keuze voor vier centrale thema's betekent in principe een keuze voor aanbodsturing. In deze volgt het kabinet het WRR-rapport zeker niet. De WRR pleitte bovendien voor een gedegen analyse (en geen quick-scan zoals het kabinet heeft verricht) op basis van een most-binding constraints methodiek.

Figuur 3. Most binding constraints – toegang tot water


Zo'n analyse zou, met de indicator 'toegang tot water' als voorbeeld, figuur 3 opleveren. Die figuur geeft inzicht in zowel de vergelijkende situatie (horizontale as, positief getal duidt erop dat de situatie in het land slechter is dan gemiddeld) en de mate waarin water binnen het land een bottleneck vormt (verticale as, positief betekent een probleem van meer dan gemiddelde urgentie). Op basis hiervan zijn landen in kwadrant IV niet interessant.

De vraag is of het uitblijven van een dergelijke analyse een andere selectie van landen zou opleveren. Voorlopige berekeningen op basis van de indicatoren 'moedersterfte' en 'toegang tot water' laten zien dat de 15 geselecteerde landen significant slechter scoren op deze indicatoren. Ook hier blijft de variatie binnen de twee groepen groot wat een indicatie is voor het willekeurig toepassen van deze criteria.

Concluderend

De vergelijking tussen individuele landen leidt tot de conclusie dat de 15 landen zijn geselecteerd op basis van criteria die niet alleen multi-interpretabel zijn, maar ook willekeurig. Aangezien nergens een bottom line (of een top line) is gedefinieerd voor de afzonderlijke criteria kan elke score voor elk afzonderlijk land als een reden voor selectie worden gepresenteerd. Met evenveel recht zou men op basis van de gebruikte criteria voor elk afzonderlijk land ook kunnen redeneren dat het land juist niet zou moeten worden geselecteerd. De enige afwijking van dit algemene patroon lijkt het economische, veiligheids of binnenlandse belang voor Nederland te zijn.

De vergelijking tussen de twee groepen landen laat, naast een aantal overeenkomsten, ook interessante verschillen zien. Die verschillen wijzen echter niet allemaal in dezelfde richting waardoor de vraag blijft wat nou daadwerkelijk de doorslag heeft gegeven in de uiteindelijke selectie.

Tegelijk laten eerste bevindingen zien dat in de gese-lecteerde landen de situatie op een aantal thematische indicatoren nog niet zo slecht heeft uitgepakt. Hier hoort wel de vraag bij of de gehanteerde methodiek niet feitelijk een kwestie van meer geluk dan wijsheid is.

1. De spreiding binnen elke groep is overigens aanzienlijk. Landen binnen één groep kunnen dus ver uit elkaar liggen. Dat betekent ook dat het aantonen van daadwerkelijk robuuste verschillen, mede gezien het kleine aantal landen in elke groep, moeilijk zijn hard te maken. De hier geconstateerde verschillen moeten dan ook meer als tendensen worden gezien.

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Monday, April 11, 2011

Has NGO advertising gone too far?

Aid Watch

by Alanna Shaikh. Alanna is a global health professional who blogs at UN Dispatch and Blood and Milk.

Over the last couple of years, we have seen a lot of criticism of how international NGOs advertise and fundraise. There's a new term – "poverty porn" – and a new emphasis on thinking seriously about the true impact of advertising.

I've heard three main arguments against oversimplified NGO advertising:

  1. These ads make donors stupid by convincing them that development problems have quick and easy answers. They also portray development itself as a rapid, simple process. This encourages donors to choose dumb projects that offer speedy, photogenic, solutions that are unlikely to have any real impact. A classic example is the over-funding of orphanages and fishing boats after the 2004 tsunami.
  2. NGO marketing demeans the individuals who benefit from aid efforts. It makes them look like passive victims instead of humans who are partners in making things better. In this social media world, these individuals will actually see the advertising that features them. They'll know exactly how they are being portrayed, and that portrayal will affect their sense of their own capacities.
  3. Oversimplified stories about aid and its impact distort government policy on international development, leading to a focus on aid, and a neglect of other policy choices that support development, like fairer trade policy or allowing more immigration. It also leads politicians to expect unreasonably rapid results and again, to favor photogenic, easy-to-explain projects.

Here's what NGOs have to say about NGO marketing: It works. Complicated narratives and long explanations don't attract attention, and they don't get donations. Heartbreaking pictures and tidy stories do. We need these kinds of ads to raise the money to actually do the complicated and difficult work.

But here is my question: Have we reached the point that it's not worth it anymore?

I think we can safely say that the fundraising for the earthquake in Japan has led to actual outrage among some aid insiders. And last Tuesday, in response to both a demeaning marketing campaign and a simplistic project with doubtful impact, we saw a Day Without Dignity. Are these signs?

How exactly will we know when the money raised is no longer worth the damage done in raising it?

 

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Four Steps to a New Online Fundraising Strategy

SSIR Opinion & Analysis

Like millions of nonprofit organizations around the world, Global Press Institute (GPI), relies on generous individuals to give to our mission and programs.

In the five-year history of GPI, a not-for-profit media organization that has trained and employed more than 110 women in 23 countries across the developing world to be professional journalists, small individual contributions have been a key ingredient to our life-support cocktail. We pride ourselves on a low-cost, high-impact model—our budget last year was less than $100,000.

For years, we sported the standard "donate" button on the top-right corner of our website. But it produced meager and unreliable results, as socially conscious netizens tire of seeing them and eventually ignore them.

In search of a new model, we ruled out social media, which requires copious time and money. Our organization publishes high-quality, context-rich investigative journalism from some of the world's most silent corners, and our readership was already strong. The question, rather, was how to connect an increased global appetite for our news and sporadic online donations.

After careful consideration, a new strategy emerged. In four steps we were able to revamp our online giving culture and more than triple the number of monthly online donations for the last six months! Here's how:

Step 1: Customize Vocabulary
GPI migrated away from the traditional NGO language of "charity," "gifts," and "donors," and toward a more action-based vocabulary that emphasized the "value" and "impact" of investments. On Oct. 1, 2010, GPI changed all language—"gifts" became "social investments" with double and triple bottom lines, "donors" became "social investors," etc.

Step 2: Rearrange the Online Puzzle Pieces
We then moved our new investment button on the homepage from the right to the left, changed it from round to square, and transformed a text-based ask into an image-based invitation. The new button features gorgeous images and powerful taglines. We also included a roll-over feature that explains the change from "donate" to "invest."

The results were immediate. Within 90 days, of every 10 people who visited our homepage, six clicked on the new investment button!

Step 3: Prize Investor Motivation With a Personalized Platform
We also changed where the button took them. Not to PayPal or a basic donate page. Instead, we created the Social Investment Center—a new platform where potential investors could learn more about GPI and make social investments based on their own motivations.

The Social Investment Center first asks one question in bright red: "What is your motivation?"

The options are People, Places, and Journalism, which link to program descriptions and real budget lines so potential investors can choose exactly how their investment is spent.

For example, one new GPI social investor is a former Peace Corps volunteer in India. When asked for his motivation, he selected Places, then clicked India. There, he found a description of a new specialty-reporting seminar for our reporters in India, "Reporting Modern Slavery."

Interested, he clicked the Invest Now link, which led him to a more detailed program description and three investment options—$168, $70, and $21—that specifically detailed what each would pay for.

On Jan. 15, the investor selected the option to invest $70, which paid a month's salary for one GPI reporter in India. He made the same social investment again on March 12 and wrote:

"When I first clicked thru here I was intrigued by the concept. After investing $70 and seeing the immediate result of the money, I am hooked! Thank you for sending me a copy of the story my investment paid for on women trapped in the cycle of poverty and resorting to surrogacy as a way out. It was indeed a unique story and so well done. I hope this investment can also go to Fozia who is doing great work thanks to your program. Sincerely, Arthur T."

Step 4: Engage Donors
As Arthur's note suggests, GPI took three direct action steps after his social investment:

  1. Mailed him a thank-you note.
  2. Updated him when an article was being produced from his investment.
  3. Sent him a link to the published article, along with a link to the same investment option.

Since the launch of the Social Investment Center, GPI has earned more than $7,000 USD—nearly 7 percent of our annual budget.

The Social Investment Center has presented some challenges. For a small organization that runs on few general operating funds, this level of donor follow-up is time-consuming.

The largest challenge, however, is that some people just don't get it. We've received questions like, "Do I earn a return on my money?" or "What if I want to make a donation and not a social investment?"

In response, we continually consider how to most effectively follow up with investors, tweak the Social Investment Center's language, and talk to potential social investors in hopes of creating clarity.

Overall, the Social Investment Center engages investors on a new level and helps people understand the full value and impact of GPI.

GPI uses journalism as a development tool. Each woman we train earns a strong living wage. She becomes a leader in her community and a voice for the voiceless. All GPI news is syndicated, free of charge, to news outlets around the world to create global awareness. We have seen women with no prior journalism experience catapult themselves into the middle of important social justice conversations and ignite social change from local villages to parliaments.

These women are certainly worth investing in. But the reality of web-based fundraising is simple—people are saturated with causes. Our Social Investment Center invites people deeper into our organization and pledges to them that 100 percent of their investment will be used exactly the way they want it to be.

The future of online giving cannot just be a Donate button and a prayer. The future must be a collaborative relationship between social investor and social organization, both willing to work together in the name of progress, innovation, and change.


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Cristi Hegranes is an award-winning journalist and international journalism trainer. She is the winner of the Ida B. Wells Award for Bravery in Journalism, the SPJ Journalism Innovation Prize, a Jefferson Award, a New Media Web Award, Clarion Award for Investigative Journalism, a Lifestyle Journalism Prize, and numerous other honors. Cristi also teaches News Entrepreneurship at San Francisco State University and international media courses at California State University.

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Sunday, April 10, 2011

People are not property: Please stop saying that countries “steal” doctors from Africa

Chris Blattman

This GUEST POST is written by Michael Clemens

This week, Professor Jonathan Wolff has warned the world that the United States "steals doctors from poorer countries" because it "simply does not train enough doctors to meet its voracious appetite for medical attention." This is a strong accusation. Professor Wolff, a philosopher, should reconsider several dubious assumptions that his strong claim requires.

First, it is illegitimate to assume that it is possible for anyone to "steal" a human being. The very concept of such an act requires it to be possible for human beings to be owned by others. The notion that health workers may be owned—while presumably Professor Wolff would be offended if any person or group claimed ownership of him—is offensive. It is also illegal where Professor Wolff resides: the United Kingdom outlawed the ownership of people by other people in 1833. People, including health workers, who voluntarily leave their countries are not passive objects of others' acts of "stealing"; they are active agents exercising a right guaranteed them by Article 13.2 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Second, it is incorrect to assume that the emigration of health workers from a poor country must cause a shortage of health workers at the origin. For decades, more nurses have left the Philippines to work abroad than leave any other country on earth. Yet in the Philippines today there are more Registered Nurses per capita than in the United Kingdom. This happened because so many Filipinos trained up as nurses to take advantage of opportunities abroad that this more than offset the departures. There is no such thing as a fixed stock of health workers in the world; they can be created, and wonderful career opportunities abroad are one of the forces that create them at home. The realities that shape the global health workforce are more complex than the simplistic picture that Professor Wolff paints.

Third, it is simply false for Professor Wolff to assert,

"If a doctor from Ghana is recruited to the US, not only does Ghana lose its doctor, it loses the money paid for the training. It may be that the doctor is likely to send a portion of earnings back home (known in the development business as 'remittances'). But this is scant compensation."

In fact, the average African-trained member of the American Medical Association left his or her country of training well over five years after earning the Medical Doctor degree—as I learned when I surveyed them. Thus an African country that has invested in the training of a typical emigrant doctor has already received several years of service from that doctor (without even accounting for care provided during medical school). So it is false to say that the investment in the training of those people is fully "lost". Furthermore, African-trained members of the American Medical Association send home to Africa, on average, over $6,000 per year, even 20 years after arriving in the United States—including those who send no money. Far from being "scant compensation", this means that the typical African-trained doctor coming to the United States has sent back much more than the cost of training another doctor in the country he or she came from.

Fourth, Professor Wolff's argument requires the assumption that a proper policy goal of any country is that of zero immigration. Professor Wolff argues that the U.S. should train as many health workers as it needs. This, logically and inescapably, implies zero migration for health workers. (If every country did this, there logically could be no international movement of health workers as such—unless of course they gave up their professions and cleaned floors.) Zero migration of health workers means that the Ghanaian emigrant doctors Professor Wolff refers to must be forced to live in Ghana against their will—at a small fraction of the living standard of their colleagues in other countries, and of Professor Wolff's living standard—or give up their profession to live elsewhere. "Self-sufficiency" in doctors at the destination would leave no other options for any of them. The ethical legitimacy of that state of affairs, and the consequent legitimacy of policies designed to bring it about, deserve more pondering than they have apparently received from philosophers. Taking actions that consign others to fates we would not accept for ourselves is something that we should do only with sad reluctance, based on great certainty and overwhelming evidence that directly harming health workers in this fashion will save lives. Professor Wolff has no such evidence.

Too much of the writing on health worker migration appears oblivious to the notion that health workers have agency or rights, and to the idea that the realization of health workers' ambitions is an inherent good. I would expect philosophers to be the first concerned with such things, not the last. To anyone reading this post, I plead: If you ever say that health workers from poor countries are "stolen" or "poached", please stop. That small change will mean that you begin to speak of them as human beings rather than owned property. Discussions of their movement must start from that premise, inside or outside our departments of philosophy.

In this paper I offer a non-technical summary of research on the above claims, and on related claims about the effects of skilled-worker migration on poor countries.

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Advice for Donating to Japan Disaster Relief

Ken's Commentary

To assist donors in making wise charitable giving choices in helping with the relief efforts in Japan, we, at Charity Navigator, offer these five main tips:



  1. Avoid newly formed charities: The disaster in Japan is of epic proportions. It will be a challenge for even long-established charities with years of experience to provide assistance and help rebuild. There is little chance that a brand new charity, even one with the best of intentions, will be efficient and effective.

  2. Send money, not supplies: In a disaster situation, to help victims quickly and effectively, cash is King. So many of us want to do something tangible. Our impulse is to box up used clothing or buy new supplies and ship it to the victims. But, even if you could mail such items, it is unlikely at best that there is someone waiting in Japan to receive your goods or direct them to those in need. This was evident during Haiti when there were instances of supplies sitting in piles on airport runways and eventually being discarded. In fact, this is precisely why charities play an important part in disaster support. They have the capability to secure what is most needed through in-kind donations from corporations on the scale that's needed in Japan, ship them to the region and see them properly distributed. So, if you really want to do something with things you no longer need, consider having a garage sale and turning them into cash which you can then donate to a charity.

  3. Beware of solicitations: Do not wait for the charity to contact you. Be proactive in identifying great charities that are worthy of your hard earned money. If a charity calls, hang up. If you receive an email from a charity that you didn't sign up to receive, then delete it. Do not click through on links in Facebook and other social media applications. Do not give cash to someone on the street. And above all, do not respond to emails from people claiming to be victims.

  4. Research your charity's website: During Hurricane Katrina, criminals established more than 4,000 websites to steal generous and unsuspecting donors' personal information and money. Take the time to find the charity's legitimate website. At Charity Navigator we link to each verified charity's site so that you can quickly go there to donate online.

  5. Keep tabs on your donation: It is so important that you do a little bit of research on the front end. It may be months or years before we know precisely how our donations made a difference in Japan. However, that doesn't mean that you shouldn't hold the charity you donate to accountable. You should check back with the charity in the coming months and expect to find progress reports to see how your donation was utilized. The best nonprofits don't just tell stories on their websites but provide evidence of their overall effectiveness and results in helping out in a disaster. The best charities will openly admit the challenges and disappointments they faced as well as the accomplishments they achieved helping the victims in Japan.

It has been noted that donors aren't giving as rapidly as they did after Haiti. We believe a good part of this can be attributed to the fact that Japan is a more developed nation and some question their need for financial support. However, governments alone can not address the historic crisis that is currently facing the Japanese people. Charities provide a vital role in this type of emergency that requires your charitable support for them to be able to act quickly and effectively.


Some have pointed out that you should not restrict your donation to only help in the Japan relief effort. They argue, and we agree, that it is better not to hamstring charities by designating your gift. If you trust the charity, then allow it the flexibility to spend your donation as best it can --- which in the end may mean using excess funds for the charity's work in other parts of the world. However given the horrible and widespread suffering of the Japanese people, we suspect that most of the charities engaged in this effort will need every donation they can get.


In conclusion, if you follow these tips for giving and do a little research before you donate, you will find those charities you are looking for and you'll significantly minimize your chances of being scammed in helping now and whenever a disaster strikes.


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