Wednesday, May 8, 2013

The sun is at last setting on Britain's imperial myth | Pankaj Mishra

Global development news, comment and analysis | guardian.co.uk

The atrocities in Kenya are the tip of a history of violence that reveals the repackaging of empire for the fantasy it is

Scuttling away from India in 1947, after plunging the jewel in the crown into a catastrophic partition, "the British", the novelist Paul Scott famously wrote, "came to the end of themselves as they were". The legacy of British rule, and the manner of their departures – civil wars and impoverished nation states locked expensively into antagonism, whether in the Middle East, Africa or the Malay Peninsula – was clearer by the time Scott completed his Raj Quartet in the early 1970s. No more, he believed, could the British allow themselves any soothing illusions about the basis and consequences of their power.

Scott had clearly not anticipated the collective need to forget crimes and disasters. The Guardian reports that the British government is paying compensation to the nearly 10,000 Kenyans detained and tortured during the Mau Mau insurgency in the 1950s. In what has been described by the historian Caroline Elkins as Britain's own "Gulag", Africans resisting white settlers were roasted alive in addition to being hanged to death. Barack Obama's own grandfather had pins pushed into his fingers and his testicles squeezed between metal rods.

The British colonial government destroyed the evidence of its crimes. For a long time the Foreign and Commonwealth Office denied the existence of files pertaining to the abuse of tens of thousands of detainees. "It is an enduring feature of our democracy," the FCO now claims, "that we are willing to learn from our history."

But what kind of history? Consider how Niall Ferguson, the Conservative-led government's favourite historian, deals with the Kenyan "emergency" in his book Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World: by suppressing it entirely in favour of a Kenyan idyll of "our bungalow, our maid, our smattering of Swahili – and our sense of unshakeable security."

The British had slaughtered the Kikuyu a few years before. But for Ferguson "it was a magical time, which indelibly impressed on my consciousness the sight of the hunting cheetah, the sound of Kikuyu women singing, the smell of the first rains and the taste of ripe mango".

Clearly awed by this vision of the British empire, the current minister for education asked Ferguson to advise on the history syllabus. Schoolchildren may soon be informed that the British empire, as Dominic Sandbrook wrote in the Daily Mail, "stands out as a beacon of tolerance, decency and the rule of law".

Contrast this with the story of Albert Camus, who was ostracised by his intellectual peers when a sentimental attachment to the Algeria of his childhood turned him into a reluctant defender of French imperialism. Humiliated at Dien Bien Phu, and trapped in a vicious counter-insurgency in Algeria, the French couldn't really set themselves up as a beacon of tolerance and decency. Other French thinkers, from Roland Barthes to Michel Foucault, were already working to uncover the self-deceptions of their imperial culture, and recording the provincialism disguised by their mission civilisatrice. Visiting Japan in the late 1960s, Barthes warned that "someday we must write the history of our own obscurity – manifest the density of our narcissism".

Perhaps narcissism and despair about their creeping obscurity, or just plain madness explains why in the early 21st century many Britons, long after losing their empire, thought they had found a new role: as boosters to their rich English-speaking cousins across the Atlantic.

Astonishingly, British imperialism, seen for decades by western scholars and anticolonial leaders alike as a racist, illegitimate and often predatory despotism, came to be repackaged in our own time as a benediction that, in Ferguson's words, "undeniably pioneered free trade, free capital movements and, with the abolition of slavery, free labour". Andrew Roberts, a leading mid-Atlanticist, also made the British empire seem like an American neocon wet dream in its alleged boosting of "free trade, free mobility of capital … low domestic taxation and spending and 'gentlemanly' capitalism".

Never mind that free trade, introduced to Asia through gunboats, destroyed nascent industry in conquered countries, that "free" capital mostly went to the white settler states of Australia and Canada, that indentured rather than "free" labour replaced slavery, and that laissez faire capitalism, which condemned millions to early death in famines, was anything but gentlemanly.

These fairytales about how Britain made the modern world weren't just aired at some furtive far-right conclave or hedge funders' retreat. The BBC and the broadsheets took the lead in making them seem intellectually respectable to a wide audience. Mainstream politicians as well as broadcasters deferred to their belligerent illogic. Looking for a more authoritative audience, the revanchists then crossed the Atlantic to provide intellectual armature to Americans trying to remake the modern world through military force.

Of course, like Camus – who never gave any speaking parts to Arabs when he deigned to include them in his novels set in Algeria – the new bards of empire almost entirely suppressed Asian and African voices. The omission didn't matter in a world where some crass psychologising about gay men triggers an instant mea culpa (as it did with Ferguson's Keynes apology), but no regret, let alone repentance, is deemed necessary for a counterfeit imperial history and minatory visions of hectically breeding Muslims – both enlisted in large-scale violence against voiceless peoples.

Such retro-style megalomania, however, cannot be sustained in a world where, for better and for worse, cultural as well as economic power is leaking away from the old Anglo-American establishment. An enlarged global public society, with its many dissenting and corrective voices, can quickly call the bluff of lavishly credentialled and smug intellectual elites. Furthermore, neo-imperialist assaults on Iraq and Afghanistan have served to highlight the actual legacy of British imperialism: tribal, ethnic and religious conflicts that stifled new nation states at birth, or doomed them to endless civil war punctuated by ruthless despotisms.

Defeat and humiliation have been compounded by the revelation that those charged with bringing civilisation from the west to the rest have indulged – yet again – in indiscriminate murder and torture. But then as Randolph Bourne pointed out a century ago: "It is only liberal naivete that is shocked at arbitrary coercion and suppression. Willing war means willing all the evils that are organically bound up with it."

This is as true for the Japanese, the self-appointed sentinel of Asia and then its main despoiler during the second world war, as it is for the British. Certainly, imperial power is never peaceably acquired or maintained. The grandson of a Kenyan once tortured by the British knows this too well as: having failed to close down Guantánamo, he resorts to random executions through drone strikes.

The victims of such everyday violence have always seen through its humanitarian disguises. They have long known western nations, as James Baldwin wrote, to be "caught in a lie, the lie of their pretended humanism". They know, too, how the colonialist habits of ideological deceit trickle down and turn into the mendacities of postcolonial regimes, such as in Zimbabwe and Syria, or of terrorists who kill and maim in the cause of anti-imperialism.

Fantasies of moral superiority and exceptionalism are not only a sign of intellectual vapidity and moral torpor, they are politically, economically and diplomatically damaging. Japan's insistence on glossing over its brutal invasions and occupations in the first half of the 20th century has isolated it within Asia and kept toxic nationalisms on the boil all around it. In contrast, Germany's clear-eyed reckoning and decisive break with its history of violence has helped it become Europe's pre-eminent country.

Britain's extended imperial hangover can only elicit cold indifference from the US, which is undergoing epochal demographic shifts, isolation within Europe, and derision from its former Asian and African subjects. The revelations of atrocities in Kenya are just the tip of an emerging global history of violence, dispossession and resistance. They provide a new opportunity for the British ruling class and intelligentsia to break with threadbare imperial myths – to come to the end of themselves as they were, and remake Britain for the modern world.


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Cashless Bus Payments from Google & Equity Bank

Bankelele
Someone said that a matatu owner is the seventh or eighth person to get paid at the end of a busy day, only getting residual cash after the driver, turn boy, tout, tax man, council person, policeman, and sometimes the driver's girlfriend have taken their cut. But on Tuesday April 30, Google and Equity Bank unveiled BebaPay, a cashless way for commuters to pay for transport in buses in Kenya - and which propels owners right to the front of that queue.

The transport sector has many challenges and is known for some unpleasant habits like reckless driving, price hikes when it rains, bribing traffic police, ill-treatment of passengers, having unroadworthy vehicles etc. - but some investors who purchase the vehicles than can cost an average of Kshs. 4 million ($47,000) believe that a common thread behind these habits is the amount of liquid money that the sector generates and which is easily diverted to make many payments, even illegal ones. 

BebaPay enables commuters to pay their fares by using a card, which is then tapped to a phone in the bus enabling exact payments (even small ones like Kshs 20 [~$0.25] to be deducted from the user's card and uploaded into the owners accounts that are at Equity Bank.  

Currently, many owners only get to know how much money they have earned at the end of the day, but with BebaPay they are able monitor their cash receipts online or via Equity banks' mobile phone platform - Eazzy247.

Another feature is that users who purchase & register cards will get SMS notifications each time the cards are used - and this can be a useful for parents who send their kids to from school on public transport to track when and where their kids pay for transport using the card. Also users can send money to people on buses to pay for transport, and the system will also link with M-pesa which is ubiquitous in Kenya.

Obtaining a free BebaPay card takes about 20 minutes at an Equity bank agent - this is to enable them to take down ID and gmail details (even create a new one), and to create a BebaPay account in which a commuter inputs a password. This enables one to get an SMS notification each time the card is topped up and to monitor their card activity online.

Other Comments at the Launch
- The Chairman of the Matatu Owner's Association said he expects some resistance to the changes. He also called on the government to institute training for people who work in the sector and for legislation to eliminate cash payments for transport. 
- One vehicle owner said that gangs run bus stages in dowtown Nairobi and have to get paid daily before a bus is allowed to stop & pick passengers. 
- The Equity Bank CEO said the public transport sector is the bigger consumer of notes & coins and that handling all that cash comes with costs & risks that can be eliminated with BebaPay.

- The Deputy President of Kenya said cash-less payments that go directly into business people's accounts will enable banks to lend based on cash flow, rather that collateral.
- The two permanent secretaries (who currently double as acting ministers) both revealed their past unsuccessful attempts to invest in the matatu business.
- The Nairobi Governor said that  the government will train new traffic marshals to manage traffic at roundabouts which will create employment for the youth and free up policemen for other duties. 
- Every day, 1.5 million Google android phones are activated and 1.5 million Kenyans use matatus. 

Other Reading:

Bloomberg: Major banks in Sweden have stopped handling cash in many of their local branches as many people rely on credit cards, the Internet and mobile phones to make all their payments...bank notes are only used in about 20% of shop transactions. 

The official Google Africa blog notes that BebaPay uses smart cards powered by Near Field Communication (NFC) technology, plus software from Google. The NFC technology means that payment can take place offline, even when there is no power or network connectivity.


Juuchini blog asks Is Kenya ready for public transport debit cards?



Quartz: It is becoming increasingly inaccurate to call Google an internet company  and the free BebaPay app turns any NFC-enabled Android phone into a card reader, which means that shops, traders and small businesses can use BebaPay to accept payments from customers, without needing expensive tills and cash registers. 


Think M-Pesa: Is Google trying to replicate m-pesa
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Monday, May 6, 2013

Growth and other good things

Baobab

THERE is no shortage of economic growth in Africa. Six of the world's ten fastest growing economies of the past decade are in sub-Saharan Africa. A clutch of countries have enjoyed growth in income per person of more than 5% a year since 2007. Zambia is one of them. Yet a frequent complaint heard in Lusaka, the capital, is that the country's rising GDP has passed much of the population by. The populist appeal of Michael Sata, who became president in 2011, is in part explained by a sense that ordinary Zambians had missed out on the benefits of economic growth.

GDP is not a perfect measure of living standards. A new study from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and the Tony Blair Africa Governance Initiative takes a broader look at well-being in Africa. As well as income per person, BCG's gauge of living standards includes jobs, governance, health, and inequality. Measured in this way, well-being in much of sub-Saharan Africa is lower than it ought to be, given rising average incomes per person. Levels of well-being in South Africa are out of whack with its GDP per head. Kenya and Ghana do a much better job of reaping the benefits of a growing economy.

Yet many of the countries whose well-being has improved most in the past five years are in Africa. This list is headed by Angola and includes Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania. All have enjoyed rapid growth in GDP per person. But they have also done well at translating that strong growth into improved well-being: in technical terms, the correlation between GDP per person and well-being above one in these countries (see chart). Income growth per person has been above 5% a year in Ghana, Mozambique and Uganda, too. But increases in well-being have not been quite as rapid as in the best performers.

Zambia is another of Africa's fast growers but it is the worst performer by a distance at turning that GDP growth into greater well-being. It has improved only half as much as it should have, given the growth in GDP per head. So those who feel Zambia has somehow missed out, despite the great strides it has made, have a point.

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Is it time for a rethink on the definition of aid?

From Poverty to Power by Duncan Green

Crushed by my humiliation at the hands of Claire Melamed, it would just make matters worse to come back for another round of post-2015 jousting, so let's move on.

I actually quite like blogging about meetings held under Chatham House rules, as they allow me to write about the discussion without worrying about who said what. And to take the credit for anything clever, of course.

So last week, I found myself in a heated debate on the future of aid, with a bunch of NGOs and aid boffins. The topic was 'is it time for a re-think?' Why? Because the aid world is changing:

-          New donors, such as foundations, philanthropists and emerging economies such as China and India are starting their own aid programmes, oftenChina-aid-Cambodian-flood-007 outside the traditional donor club of the OECD DAC

-          Increasing diversity of sources of 'financing for development', from domestic taxation to remittances to private investment

-          Austerity driving many traditional donors to cut aid, either overtly or sneakily, by trying to count lots of non-aid flows as aid, or both (see FT letter here). A reminder that in terms of its increasing aid budget, the UK is really an outlier these days – 'we are talking in the vicarage, here'.

-          The post-2015 discussions raising lots of questions about sustainable development goals and collective action on everything from climate change to tax havens, which have been traditionally fenced off from the aid discussion.

Underlying all this was a sense that the definition of aid corresponds to an old order (rich northern countries give cash for big push in the South to get public services functioning and the economy humming). That world has little to do with many of the preoccupations of modern development – fragile states and conflict, climate change, leaky financial systems, migration etc etc.

But does that mean aid needs to be overhauled? All were agreed that the current levels of aid, running globally at around $130bn a year, are a precious achievement, the only flow of resources aimed specifically at helping poor people, with a reasonably tight definition, making it easier to defend from dilution. Lots of talk of not throwing babies out with bathwater. (And tanks on lawns, heads in sand – mixed metaphors threatened to get seriously out of control.)

Which brought us to the political context – the march of the Austerians means that any decision to open up discussions on the definition of aid (which governments such as Netherlands and Germany are already doing) is much more likely to lead to a watering down/dilution of aid, with lots of other stuff being included – I pointed out that, in contrast to Pandora's Box, the nasties will fly in when this one is opened.

Broadly, aid donors will want 'what allows you to reach your aid target without spending any more money', while aid recipients will want to keep everything separate, so additional cash for things like climate finance is not counted as aid. One old hand said 'and the donors will win.'

Which made me line up on the 'conservative' side of the table – the risks are largely downside, so try and resist efforts to redefine aid and defend what you've got. Others felt that the debate was already happening, and we had no option but to engage.

Everyone was for improved data and transparency (who isn't?) on non-aid flows, so that donors, governments and others could see what is already happening before allocating their cash (lots of praise for the new DFI/Oxfam Government Spending Watch database of how much poor countries are spending on the MDGs, with seasoned aid officials saying they had spent years trying to get this data out, without success). Another piece of good news is that Development Initiatives are working on an annual report on Investments to End Poverty, which documents all resources available for poverty eradication – watch out for it in September and see some of the material here.

you sure about this?

you sure about this?

Lots of discussion on the 0.7 target, with the technocrats seeing it as arbitrary and weird, and the advocates seeing its use in driving government action, even in countries that haven't endorsed it, like the US. Interesting suggestions that 1% of government spending (a penny in the pound) might make a more sensible and communicable target than 0.7% of Gross National Income.

As for the new southern aid donors, the wonks reckoned that they are not interested in targets, but are interested in what counts as aid – one cited Turkey which, when obliged to count it, found it was giving much more aid than it had realised, partly because it had assumed a narrower.

Other interesting discussions on 'fair shares' – how you could modify the 0.7 target to take account of a country's stage of development, perhaps using the UN formula for assessing members' contributions to its budget. Anyone done that?

Overall, I did feel that there is an institutional problem here – at some point the aid discussion needs to be taken out of the OECD, even though it's been doing a pretty good job so far. Otherwise, it risks being seen as a project of the declining North, with minimal buy in from others. But would the UN (the obvious alternative) do a better job?

My conclusion? At this political moment, I think there is a real danger in trying to stretch the debate on aid to include everything that contributes to development (we wonks always like to do this – look at post-2015). Right now the test of any proposal should be 'what is most likely to increase rather than reduce funds going from rich countries to poor countries for good purposes?' For example, stretching 'aid' to include most peacekeeping fails that test badly  -   irrespective of all the good sense about security and development reinforcing each other. Better to try and keep the aid definition (and debates) tight and work on the rest in other fora – Government Spending Watch, tax havens, climate change etc. We won't win them all – for example there is clearly substantial overlap between climate finance and aid, so insisting on 'additionality' is very unlikely to succeed, but I see little benefit in helping others prize open the Pandora's Box of aid.

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What the World Bank Does Not Understand About “Doing Business”

Global Dashboard - Blog covering International affairs and global risks

World Bank Doing Business

In its 10-year history, the World Bank's Doing Business Report has achieved enormous influence. The annual study, one of the flagship knowledge products of the World Bank, is the leading tool to judge the business environments of developing countries, generating huge coverage in the media every year. Several countries—such as Rwanda—have used it as a guide to design reform programs. For its part, the Bank has advised over 80 countries on reforms to regulations measured in the DB. Its influence stretches even to academia, with over 1,000 articles being published in peer-reviewed journals using data in the index.

But does it focus on the most important issues for companies in less developed countries?

Based on my own almost 20 years of experience doing business in places such as Nigeria, Turkey, and China, the answer is no.

Overemphasizing the Regulatory Aspects of Business Climates

The Doing Business reports lean heavily on assessments of the regulatory aspects of business climates in making its judgments. Of the 10 indicators that make up its aggregate ranking, at least eight (starting a business, dealing with construction permits, protecting investors, registering property, paying taxes, enforcing contracts, trading across borders, and resolving insolvency)—and conceivably all ten—depend heavily on the nature of the regulatory regime. As the current report states, "A growing body of research has traced out the effects of simpler business regulation on a range of economic outcomes, such as faster job growth and an accelerated pace of new business creation."

This is certainly true. The easier it is to start a company, the more likely people are going to. The easier it is to register property, the more likely it will be, potentially providing a spur to investment in housing, spending on household goods, and capital formation. The easier it is to get a construction permit, the more likely companies will invest in new projects that involve construction.

But there are many more serious obstacles—namely those related to transaction costs—to doing business in less developed countries that are not addressed in these reports. As such, DB's narrow focus and wide influence distort priorities and lead reformers to ignore key problems.

A better approach would be to actually consider the challenges a typical small-to-medium sized enterprise (containing, say, 5 to 50 employees) faces in a less developed country. This is what DB is supposed to be doing, but its focus on the formal procedures of government ignores how most companies operate: if they are large, firms use "work-arounds"; if they are small, firms operate in the informal economy. Its dependence on "local experts, including lawyers, business consultants, accountants, freight forwarders, government officials and other professionals routinely administering or advising on legal and regulatory requirements" mean that results reflect the needs and perspectives of these respondents, not that of a SME owner, especially in less developed countries where these "local experts" rarely work for SMEs. Limiting data collection to the single, largest city—which may contain only a small proportion of a country's businesses—further reduces the usefulness of the data.

Operating in the informal economy, generally avoiding contact with government bodies that are not trusted, confronting myriad infrastructure problems, regularly struggling to get paid for services rendered, SMEs in less developed countries have many more important things to worry about than "resolving insolvency" and "protecting investors," which combine to make up one-fifth of the DB aggregate score. Such issues are more important to foreign investors than local retail stores, trading companies, manufacturing shops, and trucking firms.

The Genuine Needs of SMEs

Focusing on the genuine needs of local SMEs would lead to a much stronger emphasis on transaction costs, which weigh heavily on companies in ways that are not reflected in these reports. In many cases, the problems are so severe that small firms cannot do business with strangers or across distance simply because they have few mechanisms—no matter how good or bad regulation is—to ensure that these transactions will work out satisfactorily.

Issues that drive up transaction costs include:

  • The high cost and lack of reliability in moving or procuring goods across distance (because of poor infrastructure, petty corruption, and the lack of efficient logistics/distribution systems, etc.)
  • No reliable way to enforce contracts, especially with strangers with which business owners have no common social ties (few small companies would even consider going to the court system)
  • No place to store savings, transfer money across distance, or reliably offer credit
  • No independent way to judge the reliability of potential business partners
  • Few ways to penalize anyone who steals goods
  • No easy or safe way to store goods—especially of quantity—for any length of time

Some of these issues are the direct product of the large number of market failures and institutional voids that predominate in less developed countries. Even if the regulations are right, countries may offer no way to check the credit histories of companies and families, have overly expensive inputs for certain important products (such as fertilizer for farm goods), have courts too distant and unreliable to be used by most firms, and lack financial institutions that serve smaller companies, especially outside the capital.

Others are the product of social divisions, which drive up the cost to do business. In environments with weak social cohesion and weak government institutions, companies may only be able to do business with firms owned by people from the same identity group or with which they have a long-standing relationship. Working with anyone else is much riskier because of the inability to enforce contracts with strangers. (Such conditions partly explain why disapora communities, such as the Lebanese in West Africa, have great advantages over local populations.)

Some are the product of how governments operate. But they are less due to faulty regulation—though more rules can make the problems worse—than to the incompetence and petty corruption that infests government bodies. Repeated stoppages on major roads, for instance, are usually not due to bad regulation but to how officials make use of existing regulation to serve their own interests. As long as governments are not robust enough to implement their own rules effectively, the rules aren't the most important problem.

Of course there are a number of other issues that matter greatly to SMEs that are not addressed by the DB, such as political stability, security, regulatory predictability, financial inclusion, and access to important social networks. Larger companies can compensate for most if not all of these issues in ways that SMEs cannot.

Precluding A Deeper Understanding

By missing a lot of valuable information, the DB rankings fail to portray an accurate reading of business climates. China, for instance, ranks a somewhat mediocre 91st in the recent report, below the Kyrgyz Republic (70th), Romania (72nd), Moldova (83rd), Albania (85th), and Jamaica (90th), none of which are known for the same dynamism. Indonesia, one of the developing world's most promising emerging markets, is ranked 128th, right ahead of Bangladesh, India, and Nigeria, all known for their rather difficult business environments. Both Ethiopia (ranked 127th) and Cambodia (ranked 133rd) rank even further down the list even though they have been among the fastest growing countries in the world over the past decade.

These reports do have value, as the issues they address are important and generally should be targets of reform. But the DB's very success has in some ways precluded a deeper understanding of why many states fail to advance. Economists, free market proponents, and people whose main experience is in multinational companies or in developed countries may see that relaxing regulation is the most important way to improve the performance of less developed economies, but the average micro entrepreneur or ambitious small business owner in places such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan would focus elsewhere.

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Volunteer placements in development: 10 ways to make them count

Global development news, comment and analysis | guardian.co.uk

From managing expectations to setting up child protection policies and supporting local NGOs, our expert panel recommend how to get the best out of volunteer programmes

Katie Turner, global research and advocacy advisor, volunteering for development, Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), London, UK

Learning should be reciprocal between volunteers and the communities they work in: Volunteers must develop a strong knowledge of the context within which they are placed. Some of this learning can be supported by the volunteer organisation through language training and briefing on the in-country context before the volunteer starts their placement. However, the onus also has to be on the volunteer to think about their placement in its broader context.

As development evolves, so should volunteering: If volunteering in development is truly driven by the needs and proposed solutions of communities then we should be constantly coming up with innovative and effective solutions to meet these needs. Along with the broader development agenda, volunteerism must continue to evolve and innovate in order to bring about sustainable change.

Katherine Tubb, founder, 2Way Development, London, UK

The length of the programme is a good indicator of who benefits: Highly skilled volunteers can have a positive impact on communities in about three months, but six months is seen as a good average placement length, where volunteers can actually add value to the work of an NGO. Any less and I would argue that the benefits are more on the side of the volunteer.

Resources:
Ethical tourism group, Tourism Concern, has been working on an international volunteering standards group code of best practice for some years. This is a useful resource for those setting up volunteering initiatives.

Hayford Siaw, executive director, Volunteer Partnerships for West Africa (VPWA), Accra, Ghana

Support volunteering in local NGOs: It is worrying to see foreign volunteer organisations mobilising people to go to Africa for placements with no structures in place to receive them. The best way to volunteer is to provide direct institutional support to grassroots NGOs that understand their community needs. They can be harder to find, as the biggest NGOs dominate on search engines such as Google, but websites such as the online volunteering portal are useful.

Simona Costanzo Sow, project manager, post-2015, United Nations volunteers programme, Bonn, Germany

Longer placements aren't necessarily better: Short term programmes can be very effective when they are part of a longer term local community effort, especially when engaging young people. The key is that the volunteers, hosts and sending organisations are clear about the objective of the programme. The volunteer should be there to share something with his or her peers in the country, not to teach anything. Bringing a different perspective and developing new solutions along with local youth can be very inspiring.

Ben Wilson, project assistant, Challenges Worldwide, Edinburgh, UK

Don't be patronising in your messaging: The way volunteer groups communicate their ideals through social media and events like Comic Relief can be patronising and harmful to communities in the south. Having met with school groups who have 'partnerships' with schools in developing countries, I've found that most of the children only know the global south through the dominant media expositions of it. The regulation of developing country imagery is essential to dispel misinformation.

Resources:
Some useful resources and best practice guides for volunteer sending organisations are available from development networks Comhlamh and Nidos.

Adam McGuigan, co-founder and artistic director, Barefeet, Lusaka, Zambia

Be targeted: Designing well thought out placements that match community needs with appropriate volunteer skills is not rocket science, but many agencies rush this process and get it wrong. Accounting for International Development (AfiD) is a good example of an organisation that provides targeted, effective and sustainable short-term volunteer programmes.

Nichole Georgeou, lecturer, international development studies, Australian Catholic University, Sydney, Australia

True partnerships are difficult to form: When western volunteers arrive into developing country contexts, they enter into existing hierarchies that they usually do not recognise or understand. These hierarchies have been shaped by histories of colonialism and development. In this context, true partnership is difficult to achieve as asymmetries of power are present in the relationship from the start.

Liz Wilson, director, Supporting Kids In Poverty (Skip), Trujillo, Peru

Child protection is crucial: Any organisation working with children must give consideration to child protection. I attended an NGO conference last year and was surprised to find that none of the grassroots organisations had a child protection policy. Many did not do background checks on their volunteers, and had no child protection procedure. To me these things are absolutely fundamental if you are going to work with children.

Resource:
Tearfund has published a basic step-by-step guide to writing a child protection policy for international NGOs.

Apeksha Sumaria, head of programmes, Accounting for International Development (AfID), London, UK

Manage expectations: It's very important to ensure that volunteer aspirations (about what they are able to achieve) are the same as partner expectations (about what volunteers are able to help them with). Then come the practicalities: ensuring that the volunteer is experienced enough to support the partner, that there is a partner and staff for the volunteer to work with and that the project objectives are clearly set out.


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