Saturday, March 24, 2012

Malawi’s democracy dips into recession – By Keith Somerville

African Arguments

President Bingu wa Mutharika is displaying signs of increasing authoritarianism in Malawi.

Between independence in 1964 and the referendum to end the one party state in 1993, Malawi was almost a stereotype of an African autocracy with a geriatric Life President, a violent youth movement which beat or killed his opponents and no real freedom of expression.  But from the multiparty elections in 1994 until last year it seemed, despite one or two potholes on the path of progress, that Malawi was moving steadily down the road to greater democracy and accountability. Events of the weekend of 17 and 18 March show increasing intolerance of critics and a willingness to use the police and dubious legal means to silence them.

The election in May 2004 of Bingu wa Mutharika, a former World Bank official who had served at the United Nations Economic Commission of Africa and as Secretary General of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), was broadly welcomed in Malawi and among Malawi's major aid donors.

Mutharika succeeded to the leadership of the governing United Democratic Front after senior Malawian politicians (with evident public support) stopped President Bakili Muluzi from altering the constitution to stand for a third term.  Muluzi had been elected in 1994 in the first multiparty elections and served in Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda's cabinet and senior party positions, but had been suspected of his own presidential ambitions and sacked and jailed by the ever watchful Banda.

Muluzi's attempt to change the rules on presidential terms had been opposed widely in Malawi, where bad memories of Banda's Life Presidency remained.  The blocking of this move to prolong his rule ended Muluzi's career and Mutharika became leader of the UDF and won the election.  Despite arguments within his own party (leading to the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party by the current President), his first term was seen broadly as a political success and the economy grew as a result of several good harvests.  Relations between the Mutharika government and donors were excellent.

Since his re-election in 2009, things have gone downhill fast.  Mutharika is becoming increasingly isolated politically, has cut himself off from foreign aid, angered donors and is showing signs of ever greater autocracy with a penchant for encouraging mob violence by his party members and youth wing against political opponents and critics.

Speaking at the opening of a new road in Thyolo on 5 March, he called on his DPP cadres to "protect" him from his critics.  This was reminiscent of speeches before and after the violent suppression of opposition demonstrations in July 2011 (in which 19 protestors died at the hands of the police, army and party thugs), when the president called on members of the DPP to beat up those who insulted him.

The road ceremony also had multiple echoes of the Banda era – the road was named after the president and he launched a verbal onslaught demanding support: "I must also ask one thing to all the tribes that are in Malawi, whether you are Lhomwe, Yao, Chewa ,Ngoni, Tumbuka, Nkhonde or Tonga, if someone comes to insult your father, do you just stay quiet… I want to say starting from today that I am tired of it. Those that are insulting me should stop".  He warned that he knew the opposition and civil society groups were planning demonstrations against him in March and said, "I ask the DPP in the south, east, central and north if they start demonstrations you should know what to do. Do not allow that demonstration to take place".  Immediately before pro-democracy demonstrations on 20 July last year, gangs wielding machetes drove around the commercial capital of Blantyre in DPP cars threatening people to stop them from demonstrating against the government.  This action limited the protests in Blantyre, but those in Lilongwe and Mzuzu took place and were met with a brutal response, with at least 19 deaths, hundreds injured and an unknown number detained.

In the Thyolo speech and in a later radio broadcast, Mutharika accused donors of supporting and funding civil society groups and the opposition to demonstrate against him.  He directly attacked donors of aid and said that, "If the donors and NGOs think this is not democracy, to hell with them. Repeat that word, to hell with them. Whichever donor wants to bring chaos in the country must leave."

Malawi's government has been at loggerheads with its two major donors – Britain and the United States – for nearly a year. It started with Britain freezing aid worth $550 million after a diplomatic row caused by a leaked diplomatic cable from Britain's High Commissioner, Fergus Cochrane-Dyet that described Mutharika as "autocratic and intolerant of criticism". Mutharika expelled the High Commissioner and Britain responded with its cut in aid.  Washington joined in the aid freeze after violent suppression of the demonstrations in July, suspending a $350 million project to upgrade Malawi's electricity grid.

The aid situation has since worsened leaving a $121 million funding gap in the budget.  The IMF suspended its loan programme to Malawi after disagreements with the government. In recent weeks, Mutharika has continued his war with donors, declining to see a World Bank delegation and attacking the IMF's conditions for new loans. Malawi relies on foreign assistance for about 40 percent of its budget.

Donors have made efforts to find a way out of the impasse with Mutharika.  A delegation of British MPs visited Malawi in mid-March.  The head of the delegation, Malcolm Bruce, urged the president to end the dispute with the World Bank and IMF.  There was no public reaction from the president to this or to the visit of the US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman. After her visit she said that President Mutharika should respect his citizens' right to freedom of expression.  According to Reuters, Sherman added that, "We have urged the government to work with the IMF and the World Bank to put an economic plan in place so that they can meet their energy needs and have a strong economy into the future."

But the omens do not look good, in his speech on national radio attacking donors, Mutharika indulged in language that was far from diplomatic, saying that his supporters should "step in and defend their father rather than just sit back and watch him take crap from donors and rights groups".

From inside Malawi there are increasingly worrying signs of the repression of critics.  In February, the former attorney-general and outspoken critic of the government, Ralph Kasambara, was reported to be under police guard in hospital following his arrest on 13 February.  Kasambara, who has accused President Bingu wa Mutharika of dictatorial actions and called for his resignation, was detained after his bodyguards fought three men who had tried to attack Kasambara's offices with petrol bombs. Criticism has also come from George Soros's Open Society Initiative, which has warned that Malawi is now heading back down the road of dictatorship. But far from getting Mutharika to amend his ways, such criticism seems like a red rag to a bull.

Over the weekend of 17-18 March police in Lilongwe arrested John Kapito, chairman of the state-funded Malawi Human Rights Commission and executive director of the Consumers' Association of Malawi. According to AFP, he was charged with holding foreign currency without having the necessary bank documents, but was later released.  His arrest followed a call by Malawi's respected Public Affairs Committee (PAC) for Mutharika to resign or call a referendum within 90 days.

Mutharika's own party has split over his autocratic actions.   In September last year, he carried out an unpopular cabinet reshuffle in which his wife became Minister for Women's Affairs/HIV and Aids Policy, and his brother Peter was promoted from Education to be Minister of Foreign Affairs. He failed to reappoint the outspoken Vice-President Joyce Banda and she left the ruling Democratic Progressive Party to found her own People's Party. Curiously, under a constitutional technicality, she remains Vice-President. The president cannot run for a third term when his current one runs out in 2014, but it is widely believed he intends to have his brother elected and to try to continue to rule through him.  The repression is no doubt intended to crush any opposition to this move.

If the economy is suffering from the denial of aid and growth is being held back, then politically, Malawi also appears to be in recession, with a big dip in the democracy index. And there are no signs that president Mutharika will do anything to aid a recovery.

Keith Somerville teaches Humanitarian Communications in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent and is founder and editor of the Africa – News and Analysis website (www.africajournalismtheworld.com).

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Watchdog raises questions over impact

Global development news, comment and analysis | guardian.co.uk

The DfID funded scheme has succeeded in energising people to consider girls' needs but should focus on making a difference

The extremely slick Girl Effect campaign is no stranger to criticism. Supported by the Nike Foundation, a philanthropic wing of the multinational sports group, the social-media savvy, slogan-heavy campaign urges world leaders to pay closer attention to adolescent girls, as an "untapped resource" for development. Invest in a girl, the initiative suggests, and "she will do the rest," pulling herself, her family, her community, and her country out of poverty.

Over the past few years, critics have slammed the campaign for playing up to stereotypes of women and girls as natural caregivers, sidelining questions of structural inequality and power imbalance, and focusing on what girls can do for development, rather than what development can do for girls.

Now, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) has released a sharply critical evaluation of the Girl Hub, a joint initiative by the Department for International Development (DfID) and the Nike Foundation. Established in February 2010 with a three-year, £11.6m grant from DfID, the initiative aims to "unleash the Girl Effect" by linking experts and advocates to large-scale development programmes, increasing the involvement of girls in the design of policies that affect them, and pushing adolescent girls further up the development agenda.

If you think that sounds lovely, but quite vague, you're not alone. ICAI, the UK's independent aid watchdog, said little information was available to help asses the impact of the Girl Hub programme. There is a lack of clarity, it said, over what Girl Hub is focusing on and how it would achieve its "big picture goals." Further, the report said: "there is a risk that Girl Hub could end up initiating many individual projects that do not link together to bring real, substantial change for girls".

Poor budgeting and financial monitoring, along with weak accountability mechanisms and the absence of anti-corruption and anti-bribery policies, are also serious causes for concern, said ICAI, which gave the programme an amber-red mark, signifying the scheme is "not performing well" and needs "significant improvements".

ICAI's discovery that Girl Hub lacked a child protection policy is particularly alarming. It was a "serious omission," stressed the watchdog, given the fact that staff are presumably dealing with adolescent girls on a regular basis, making videos of girls, and taking girls on international trips to meet policymakers. A DfID spokesperson said the Girl Hub initiative put a child protection policy in place earlier this month, as part of the process of responding to ICAI's recommendations.

Without doubt, this confirms the value of having an independent watchdog to scrutinise UK aid programmes. However, does this really soothe concerns about what is – and isn't – happening behind closed doors? How exactly could a major, DfID-funded development programme, focusing on girls, lack a child protection policy in the first place?

Summing up the watchdog's findings, ICAI chief commissioner Graham Ward said: "The idea of Girl Hub is ambitious and aims to bring new ways of thinking into DfID and the wider development community. But we found significant shortcomings in Girl Hub's governance and plans to translate its vision into tangible outcomes for adolescent girls. This is a good time for DfID to re-evaluate whether – and, if so, how – this model should be continued and made sustainable."

International development secretary Andrew Mitchell has responded by defending the "exciting and innovative" Girl Hub initiative as a project that helps give girls in the poorest countries a better chance in life, which he says is a key priority for the government. "The initial phase has seen the Girl Hub grow and develop quickly, and we have learnt from this and have already ensured that stronger planning, budgeting and evaluation controls have been put in place," he said, stressing DfID's desire to further develop its work with the private sector. The Nike Foundation said it is "very proud" to be partnering with the UK government and welcomes the ICAI report.

The Girl Hub's strengths, it seems, are also its weaknesses. Its simple messaging has succeeded in "energising" people to consider girls' needs, says ICAI. And, despite a slow start, there are indeed signs that Girl Hub has begun to make an impact influencing local decision-makers to focus efforts on adolescent girls. The Nike Foundation's experience and expertise in communications and media were key reasons for DfID partnering with the foundation in the first place, says ICAI.

But at the same time, the simple messaging implies there can be a single solution to a complex set of problems, and is a potential threat to more nuanced efforts – by the Girl Hub and others – to tackle the causes and consequences of power imbalances. "Girl Hub's underlying theory of change does take into account the wider context," says ICAI. "[The initiative] appears to have struggled, however, to reconcile the power of a simple message with its efforts to tackle a complex social problem. This has contributed to a lack of clarity about Girl Hub's role and aims."

For its part, DfID also put its significant weight – and £3.8m – behind the impressive and deeply nuanced Pathways to Women's Empowerment project, an international research programme that ran from 2006-2011 and focused on critically investigating "what works" for women's empowerment to inspire radical shifts in policy and practice away from blueprints and quick fixes. But that, by definition, means the messages from the Pathways project are not so simple, and it's unclear if and how DfID might take up its findings.


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I Finally Visited a Millennium Village: Some Reflections

Global Development: Views from the Center
By Nancy Birdsall - I finally visited a Millennium Village, the Koraro Cluster, in the northern Tigray region of Ethiopia (estimated regional population is 4.5 million people). The cluster is located in the Hawzien district (population 117,954) and is made up of 11 villages:  Koraro plus 10 neighboring villages (68,000 people total). I'd been invited by John MacArthur who [...]
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This is Nancy (12), victim of the incurable 'nodding disease' in northern Uganda

Home - Africa Journalist

nodding 7

With this blog post, I want to draw attention to an unexplainable, incurable illness that has claimed the lives of at least 170 children and has affected at least 3.000 more in northern Uganda. It is called 'nodding disease', after the nodding of the head shown by its victims. Their brain is affected, just like their body growth and ability to speak. Even if they survive, they risk remaining handicaped for the rest of their lives.

I met Nancy, the girl in the picture, after northern Uganda took centre stage in the world news in early March following the release of the controversial video 'Kony 2012' by American ngo Invisible Children. 'Kony 2012' advocates for a solution to the suffering caused by Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA was active in northern Uganda for  many years. People in the region told me they do not understand why anyone cares to talk about Kony anymore though. The most recent LRA-attack here took place six years ago. Nowadays, they explained, the threat to our children is called 'nodding disease'.

You can read some of my reports here and here (in Dutch) and here (in English). I have also added more pictures of Nancy - her father Michael Odongkora has agreed to the publicity. The images show us how desperate the parents of sick children are: fearing that their handicaped children will wander off into a river of a wildfire while they themselves are out working on the fields, they tie them to trees. Nancy is certainly not the only child in northern Uganda to 'live' like this.

Donations for the victims can be made to, amongst others, the Red Cross.

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Being Smarter About Safe Water

Innovations for Poverty Action Blog
Jeremy Hand

This blog was originally posted on the Impatient Optimists blog of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation for World Water Day.

Recently, UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation (JMP) announced the exciting news that we have achieved one of the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to reduce by half the number of people who don't have sustainable access to safe drinking-water. But the 2012 JMP report added the important caveat that "it is likely that the number of people using safe water supplies has been over-estimated." 

Indeed, providing safe water to more than 780 million people worldwide remains quite a challenge, and innovative, low-cost approaches are needed. Perhaps a smartphone is not the first tool we would seize on when assembling a safe water toolkit, but Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) is finding that chlorine dispensers combined with smartphones can deliver a powerful one-two punch against diarrheal diseases.  

The Dispensers for Safe Water (DSW) program at IPA (supported with a grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) is improving water quality by providing a point-of-collection Chlorine Dispenser System in western Kenya. Treating drinking water with dilute chlorine solution can cut child diarrhea by 41%, but this fact alone doesn't guarantee impact. Using Open Data Kit, an open source set of data collection and management tools, DSW can significantly shorten the feedback loop from data collection to course-correction, allowing us to identify challenges with real-time data and address issues at a rapid pace. Surveys are built in Excel, uploaded to a server and downloaded to a low-cost smartphone. 

DSW's field officers visit chlorine dispensers in the field and identify them individually with a quick scan of their unique barcodes. Data are collected on any dispenser hardware problems, the backup chlorine supply, and their frequency of use by local community members. Daily results are then uploaded to a centralized database and available for instant analysis to guide subsequent fieldwork.

The Chlorine Dispenser System is being scaled up in Kenya, and DSW is committed to applying rigorous evidence to programs. Having real-time data available for decision making helps take the guesswork out of safe water delivery by quickly focusing efforts where they are needed most. In this way, smartphones can help bring us one step closer to providing safe water for all.

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Shrinking Your Plastic Footprint

SSIR Articles

Shoppers in the market for a tube of lipstick may soon be able to narrow their selection by comparing not just color and price, but also how much plastic various manufacturers use. A cosmetics maker from the United Kingdom is the first business to agree to measure its "plastic footprint," using tools developed by the Plastic Disclosure Project (PDP).

"If you don't measure something, you can't manage it," explains Doug Woodring, founder of the international project that launched at the 2011 Clinton Global Initiative. As a first step toward plastic reduction, PDP encourages companies to calculate their baseline footprint by tallying their use of plastics for manufacturing, packaging, and shipping.

"We're not saying that anyone has a good or bad number," Woodring says. "Let's say your number this year is 100. Then next year, you get rid of some packaging and it drops to 90. That's a great story." The initiative is voluntary and nongovernmental. "We're trying to do this without saying ban this or tax that," he adds. Instead, PDP plans to leverage consumer and investor interest in brands associated with using less plastic.

PDP is a project of the nonprofit Ocean Recovery Alliance, based in Hong Kong, which has brought global attention to the giant plastic trash patch floating in the Pacific Ocean. Although the PDP website features images of plastic-strewn beaches and polluted waters, the organization is trying to take a neutral tone in communicating with companies. "We don't say, 'Don't use plastic,'" Woodring says. "We know it's lightweight, cheap, and durable. But if we're not thinking about what happens to this stuff for the next 200 years, we're doing ourselves a disservice. We need to look at the end life of things."

Some businesses have already started thinking about redesigning products and packaging to remove unnecessary plastic. "There's a lot of blatant waste," Woodring says. He predicts PDP will enlist 150 companies from 15 countries during 2012. They won't all be manufacturers. PDP is also reaching out to hospitals, hotels, airlines, and others that may be surprised by how much plastic they touch in the course of doing business.

Consumers are likely to pay attention to plastic-reduction stories. "Plastic has a high consumer touch point. Kids know this material. It's visible, unlike carbon," Woodring says. "When companies get out in front and show they're leaders, we think they'll be rewarded."

Socially responsible investors are just beginning to pay attention to plastics. "We think investors will see a company's plastic footprint as a valuable piece to look at in yearly investment decisions," Woodring predicts. PDP surveyed investors last year to gauge their attitude toward plastic. "At first, their reaction was, 'Why should we care?' But after we talked with them about environmental issues, wildlife issues, as well as opportunities for new investments, then 90 percent said yes, they would want to know [about a company's plastic footprint]."

Along with reducing plastic use, PDP is keen to encourage innovation when it comes to recycling and reusing the petroleum-based material. If plastic is treated as a secondary raw material instead of waste, Woodring says, "then someone out there can make value from collecting, gathering, sorting, and having someone use it." An estimated 15 million people around the world currently survive by sorting garbage. With a refocus of their energy, today's trash pickers could become part of tomorrow's plastic reuse industry.

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Monday, March 19, 2012

Africa is rising - is poverty falling?

Africa Can... - End Poverty

Several people, from The Economist to this blog, have been highlighting Africa's accelerated GDP growth of about 5 percent a year for the decade before the 2008-9 global economic crisis, and the two years since the crisis. But has this growth served to reduce poverty?


The latest globally consistent estimate of poverty rates has an answer: Yes. 


Using the measure of people living on $1.25 a day or less, the World Bank's poverty measurement team, led by my colleague Martin Ravallion, estimates that the percentage of poor Africans fell from 58 percent in 1999 to 47.5 percent in 2008.  This rate of decline of about one percentage point a year is a welcome change from the previous decade when growth was much slower and the poverty rate increased. 

 


In the past, even when the poverty rate fell, we typically found that the absolute number of poor people rose because of rapid population growth.  Between 2005 and 2008, for the first time, the absolute number of poor people also declined, from 395 million to 386 million.  Nine million Africans, equivalent to the entire population of Benin, escaped poverty during those three years.


What about individual countries?  Here, we should look at national poverty estimates, which use countries' own poverty lines. 


My colleague Mimi Oladipo's post on this blog documented Rwanda's moving one million people out of poverty.  In a survey of 18 relatively fast-growing African countries, Andy McKay finds that poverty fell in almost all of them, albeit at different rates.


Ghana and Uganda showed significant declines in poverty, helped by the fact that inequality also declined. Where growth was anemic or negative, as in Cote d'Ivoire, poverty rates increased.


In short, economic growth reduces poverty.  But we cannot be complacent.  Given that it is the region with the highest poverty rate, Africa's rate of poverty decline is too slow.  African countries need to grow faster, and increase the growth elasticity of poverty--the rate at which a given level of growth reduces poverty.

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The Invisible Christians of #Kony2012

AFRICA IS A COUNTRY


In the last few days every journalist (or outraged blogger) covering #Kony2012 has been so busy reporting on what the bloggers have been saying and putting together salad after salad of African (and therefore authentic, true etc) opinion, that they have utterly failed to actually do any journalism. That's right: reporting. Finding out what this thing is actually about. So far as I can tell there hasn't been much of this. As a result the conversation has either taken the form of handwringing over What Is To Be Done in Northern Uganda (we all think we know more about this than six-year-old Gavin and so we can all speak with great confidence on such matters) or else gawping blankly at the colossal, though suspiciously self-pronounced, power of social media. A big part of the story that is being missed is that Invisible Children and their project are firmly rooted in evangelical Christianity.

"We view ourselves as the Pixar of human rights stories", Jason Russell told the New York Times last week. But when he spoke last year at convocation at Liberty University (founder: Reverend Jerry Falwell, current chancellor: Jerry Falwell Jr.) he offered a wholly different model: "We believe that Jesus Christ was the best storyteller", he said. (Other luminaries on the Liberty convocation roster last year included Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry and Rick Warren, who obediently tweeted his support for Kony2012 having been picked out as one of IC's key "Culture-Makers".)

In a terrific report, B.E. Wilson at Alternet looked at IC's tax filings and found that the group has been funded by a host of hard right Christian groups, including the National Christian Foundation and the Caster Family Foundation, one of the biggest backers of the campaign for the anti-gay Proposition 8 in California. (Although it is not straightforward: Wilson might also have pointed out that Rich McCullen, who sits on the IC's all-white-male board of directors, is an openly gay pastor at Mission Gathering Christian Church in San Diego.)

#Kony2012 could turn out to be a big thing in the young history of the internet or it might just blow over and go away. In either case it constitutes a major development in the very much longer history of Western missionary activities in Africa, and that is the frame in which #Kony2012 needs to be understood.

Invisible Children are not at all a break away from old modes of Western engagement with the African continent towards something new-because-social-media-driven; rather they come directly out of a missionary tradition of American evangelicalism that has been growing more and more obsessed with Uganda for years. When the most successful missionaries in the world are Nigerians in the vein of Redeemed Church's Gulfstream-riding phenomenon Enoch Adeboye, and when someone like Adeboye is busy setting up churches all over America, any would-be American missionaries who fancy themselves as adventurers need to find new kinds of mission work, new ways of making themselves relevant to African societies like Uganda when converting people no longer makes sense as a primary goal.

One option has been to foment homophobia. Another, it emerges, is to make manipulative documentaries about yourself in which you urge young people to campaign for America to have another war. Maybe if technology-infatuated but proudly secularist outlets like the Guardian had looked into this, they might come up with with less mealy-mouthed (and even mealier-mouthed) coverage.

But Jason Russell knows that presenting Invisible Children as an evangelical group will be bad for business. Like New Labour during the Blair years, Invisible Children have decided that for the purposes of their mass branding they "don't do God." During his address at Liberty University Russell explained:

A lot of people fear Christians, they fear Liberty University, they fear Invisible Children – because they feel like we have an agenda. They see us and they go, "You want me to sign up for something, you want my money. You want, you want me to believe in your God." And it freaks them out.

You can watch that video of his Liberty University comments here.

And he's been pretty good at keeping a lid on it, though anyone who saw his bizarre "interview" with the fawning Piers Moron must have been struck by Russell's sudden slippage into highly-charged apocalyptic rhetoric as he indulged his delusions (the main one being the notion that Kony spends his evenings twiddling his thumbs in front of the Piers Morgan Show):

To recap: "Here's the beauty of the times we are living in," said Russell, "we are living in dramatic times and so the world is waking up to the fact that Joseph Kony right now is listening to the world. And what we want the world to know and to start hashtagging right now is "Kony Surrender", because he can hear us, he knows, he's watching."

Among the weirdest of Russell's sayings is certainly his classic claim that, "We can have fun while we end genocide. It's an adventure." This accounts for the Invisible Children's mysterious commitment to being fundamentally unserious, and while in the various responses to critiques that IC has issued they have argued that being serious is just far too boring for them, when he spoke at Liberty, Russell explained himself rather differently:

We're going to have a blast doing it because we feel like God calls us to be joyful in the work that we're doing, no matter what we're doing, and so that's really what we're about.

My point is not at all to suggest that people of faith have any less legitimacy than anyone else to engage with these kinds of issues. Pointing out the Christian basis of Invisible Children is no kind of exposé. Rather I'm saying that faith should not be excluded from the discussion of #Kony2012 just because people want to talk about how amazing they think Twitter is. It's a crucial part of all of the histories that are in play here and mustn't be ignored. Popular discussion in the US should not be about Northern Uganda (about which most of us know very little) but about our own culture. (If you haven't figured it out by now #Kony2012 is not Africa.) Why are we so susceptible to this kind of emotional manipulation and why are we incapable of engaging with the African continent in anything but the most manic fashion? The evangelical basis for the whole project needs to be reckoned with in answering these questions.

Footnote: Jason Russell Miscellany

There's a super-weird bit in the Liberty speech where Russell discusses the connection he feels with Jacob, the young Ugandan whose brother was killed by the LRA and who features heavily in the Kony2012 video.

When Jacob, who was 14, said "I want to kill myself because i have nothing to live for", I actually resonated with that because when I was 16 I wanted to kill myself because being raised in musical theater wasn't cool.

Not to make light of a teenage Russell wanting to commit suicide, but comparing your suburban fate with that of a homeless child fleeing a war zone… He can't be serious.

For those who just can't get enough of the cringe, a must-read is a toe-curling Q&A by the photographer Patrick McMullan with Jason Russell from last year.

Selected highlights:

My middle name is Radical.

I am from San Diego, California, with an upbringing in musical theater. I am going to help end the longest running war in Africa, get Joseph Kony arrested & redefine international justice. Then I am going to direct a Hollywood musical.

If Oprah, Steven Spielberg and Bono had a baby, I would be that baby.


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Kony: What’s to be done? – Alex de Waal

African Arguments

Military solutions have never been the sole answer to stopping the LRA.

As a critic of the KONY2012 campaign, I have been asked the eminently practical question, "so what would you do about Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army?" Let me take this opportunity to respond.

There have been a number of proposals for peace in northern Uganda and the resolution of the LRA problem. As a framework, let me use a nine point comprehensive approach proposed by the International Crisis Group in January 2006.[1] Three points are military, six non-military. Let me give a scorecard for each one.

  1. Apprehending the Indictees. Crisis Group called for capturing Joseph Kony and the other LRA commanders wanted by the International Criminal Court. Clearly, six years on, this has not been achieved, despite at least two major multinational operations (2006 and 2008) and other military efforts. The most recent initiative, set up in November 2011, is an African Union-led, UN and US-supported, four national joint military command. The scorecard: repeated effort, no success yet.
  2. Crossing Borders in pursuit of the LRA. Before 2006, the LRA had evaded military pressure by escaping into southern Sudan or DRC, so this recommendation was intended to ensure an end to safe havens, and in particular that the Ugandans could pursue the LRA when it crossed a border. Since 2006, there has been good cooperation, culminating in the current AU effort, which surpasses the recommendation insofar as there are four armies, from Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic under a single command, with international backing. Scorecard: expectations surpassed.
  3. Protecting Civilians. The Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) failed to protect civilian populations from the LRA. Equally seriously, UPDF troops, who were far more numerous than the LRA, were themselves responsible for many abuses against civilians. The withdrawal of the LRA from Uganda in 2006 meant that it ceased to threaten Ugandans, though it has since threatened Congolese, South Sudanese and Central Africans. The removal of the LRA threat also meant that the UPDF deployment in northern Uganda has been scaled down, and IDPs have returned to their homes. Scorecard: near total success in Uganda, limited progress outside Uganda.
  4. Comprehensive Dialogue. This recommendation referred primarily to the peace talks that were convened from 2006-2008 in southern Sudan, that didn't succeed. There is now little prospect of new peace talks, and so the recommendation as framed six years ago is no longer relevant. However, the wider issue of the political accommodation of northern Uganda within Ugandan national politics is important, and this has indeed occurred. Peace has returned to northern Uganda. Scorecard: mostly successful.
  5. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Initiative. The main concern of Crisis Group was to the return and rehabilitation of former LRA combatants, many of whom were abductees, and many of whom were children. The figure of 30,000 abductees sometimes mentioned includes both adults and children and refers to those who have been processed through reintegration programs. This represents the vast majority of former members of the LRA. Scorecard: mostly successful.
  6. Humanitarian Aid. Crisis Group focused on emergency assistance to people displaced by the war. It didn't go so far as calling for reconstruction and development. Six years on, the humanitarian crisis has been resolved to the extent that emergency relief has been replaced by reconstruction and development. Scorecard: success, with expectations exceeded.
  7. UN Security Council Action. The issue here was appointing a "UN envoy of stature" to lead the negotiations. Former Mozambican President Joachim Chissano was appointed but the initiative did not succeed. The UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council remain actively engaged, for example in mandating the four-nation military force that is spearheading the current military effort. Scorecard: recommendation implemented, but these actions have not yet achieved their goals.
  8. Truth and Reconciliation Efforts. The reference here was to healing the wounds of war, going beyond the headline issue of prosecuting the major human rights offenders and also promoting reconciliation, involving traditional reconciliation approaches, psycho-social programs, reopening schools, etc. These are all slow and complicated processes and it is difficult to assess the record, but they are being attempted, more seriously and systematically than in most post-conflict situations. Scorecard: recommendation implemented.
  9. Diplomatic Engagement. In 2006, Crisis Group referred to the need of donor countries "to engage quietly but strongly with President Yoweri Museveni and other Ugandan political leaders to make resolution of the conflict a major priority of the government and of all presidential candidates." This was a coded reference to the political marginalization of northern Uganda and the way in which the UPDF had vested interests in the ongoing conflict (senior officers had opportunities to profit) and the ruling party had political motives for retaining the country on a war footing. Six years on, although the authoritarian and militaristic nature of the Ugandan government is unchanged, its political inclusion of northern Uganda is much improved. Scorecard: partial success.

The overall scorecard is therefore:

  • Exceeded expectations: two.
  • Mostly successful: three.
  • Partial success: three.
  • Failure: one.

My answer to the question, "if you criticize KONY2012, what would you do?" is that African and international efforts have already solved most of the problems associated with the LRA and the conflict and humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda, and are making progress in the remaining areas. Let's keep up those efforts.

A second criticism is, "so what's the harm in drawing more attention to this problem?" I have a number of concerns about the impact of simplistic and paternalistic portrayals of African problems, in which Africans are treated as children waiting for Americans and Europeans to save them. I have concerns about military action being presented as the principal solution.

I also have another concern, less often voiced: the high level of attention on Kony is a distraction from other issues that are equally grave or more so. Senior policymakers' time is a very scarce resource. I recall that in 2006, senior officials in the U.S. administration estimated that President George Bush was spending more time focusing on Sudan (mostly on Darfur) than on China. What this meant in detail was that, (1) White House and State Department staff spent more time dealing with the U.S. activist groups than with the problems in Sudan itself, (2) decisions were shaped and timed by the demands of those campaigners as much as by the requirements of Sudanese realities, and (3) there was no other African political issue that could make it on to the agenda of the top decision-makers in Washington DC. Darfur was important, but not that important. Also, this exceptionally high level of attention gave the Darfur rebels the impression that they were very special indeed and could behave accordingly.

I am worried that the African troops chasing Kony will think that they have special privileges, and that the hunt for the LRA will drive other African issues off the U.S. policy agenda. Given that Invisible Children has achieved – in an election year – the remarkable feat of joining liberal internationalist students with hard-right Republican evangelicals, I worry that the U.S. administration's Africa staff will focus more effort on managing the implications of the KONY2012 campaign than responding to the many and complicated problems of the central African region.


[1] International Crisis Group, "A Strategy for Ending Northern Uganda's Crisis," Jan. 2006, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/B035-a-strategy-for-ending-northern-ugandas-crisis.aspx

This piece was originally published on the World Peace Foundation's blog – Reinventing Peace

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Don’t Judge a Book By Its Cover

David Roodman's Microfinance Open Book Blog
By David Roodman -

The author sent me a draft for comment. You can see from the cover why the publisher was interested. I'll withhold final judgment on the text until I've seen the final version. The draft concerned me—as with Milford Bateman's book, at least as much for the manner of argument as the conclusions.

The title doesn't quite make sense. What would a microfinance heretic confess? That he'd fabricated his heresy? The idea is more like: Heretical Confessions of a Microfinance Insider.

Cover, Hugh Sinclair, Confessions of a Microfinance Heretic

Here's the blurb:

Part memoir, part financial detective story, and part exposé, this is the account of a microfinance insider who joined the industry in the early 2000s with a newly minted MBA and the intention to do good in the world. But over the course of eight years, he became increasingly disillusioned and alarmed. Eventually he decided to do something about it: he became an anonymous source for The New York Times, providing information for a series of stories that covered an increasing number of microfinance scandals. The author traveled the world, from Mexico to Mongolia, with Nigeria and Mozambique in between, working for several banks, agencies and institutions. He saw microfinance at all levels, from the first-world banks who called him in the night to hush up negative publicity, to the street vendors whose lives were sometimes transformed by microloans—but all too often were not. Because microcredit is largely unregulated and poorly understood by individual investors the potential for abuse is rampant. And seduced by the high pay-back rate of the loans, banks like DB and Citibank helped push the microfinance sector to bubble-like highs. The author describes his firsthand experiences of the result: rampant corruption, exorbitant interest rates, and microloans leading to fraud, child labor, and even suicide. Much of the book centers on the scandal he uncovered involving the corrupt Nigerian nonprofit LAPO and its dealings with industry darlings Kiva and Triple Jump. Microfinance can work—the author had direct experience of this too, and lays out the conditions necessary for success. But he authoritatively debunks the myth that putting the poor of the world into debt is always a good idea.

Update: Here's a longer description:

  • A deeply personal story written by a microfinance insider who was once tapped as an anonymous source for a New York Times exposé
  • Reveals the shocking truth of the industry once hailed as the miraculous solution to world poverty
  • Profiles the few shining exceptions to industry-wide corruption and offers solutions to clean up the rest

Offering inspiring success stories, the microfinance industry depends on the faith of investors that small loans can transform the lives of the poor. But as Hugh Sinclair points out, very little solid evidence exists that microloans make a dent in long-term poverty. Evidence does exist for negligence, corruption, and methods that border on extortion. Part exposé, part memoir, and part financial detective story, this is the account of a one-time true believer whose decade in the industry turned him into a heretic.

Sinclair worked with several microfinance institutions and funds as he traveled from Mexico to Mongolia, with Nigeria, Holland, and Mozambique in between. He couldn't help but notice that even with a booming $70 billion industry on their side, the poor didn't seem any better off in practice. Exorbitant interest rates led borrowers into never-ending debt spirals, and aggressive collection practices resulted in cases of forced prostitution, child labor, suicide, and nationwide revolts against the microfinance community.

With characteristic intelligence and biting wit, Sinclair weaves a shocking tale of a system increasingly focused on maximizing profits. The situation worsened when large banks, attracted by the high repayment rates of overpriced loans, hijacked the sector and created a microfinance bubble. Sinclair details his discovery of several scandals, one of the most disturbing involving a large African Microfinance institution of questionable legality which charged interest rates in excess of 100% per year, and whose investors and supporters included some of the most celebrated leaders of the microfinance sector. Sinclair's objections were first met with silence, then threats and attempted bribery, a court case, and eventually led him to become a principle whistleblower in a sector that had lost its soul.

Microfinance can work—Sinclair describes moving experiences with several ethical and effective organizations and analyzes what made them different. But without the fundamental reforms that Sinclair recommends here, microfinance will remain an "investment opportunity" that will leave the poor with hollow promises and empty pockets.

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Food or Cash?

Development Horizons from Lawrence Haddad
Is it better to give food or cash in anti-poverty programmes?

It is a very old question with no simple answer. The context is everything. Is the food appropriate to cultural and nutritional needs? Is the food delivered efficiently? Will the food undermine the local economy? If cash (or vouchers for a cash-based alternative), is there anything in the markets to buy and if there is will the injection of demand simply raise prices leading to the traders being the major beneficiaries? Will cash empower men and disempower women? Will cash lead to more conflict? Which is the more politically palatable from the donor perspective?

This issue most recently came up in an interesting exchange between Charles Kenny of CGD and Bill O'Keefe of Catholic Relief Services in Foreign Policy. O'Keefe responded to an article by Kenny entitled "Haiti Doesn't Need Your Old T Shirt" which makes the argument that cash is what is needed in many of humanitarian contexts. O'Keefe provided a defence of the US Food Aid system, saying that it has fed millions of people and that cash is not always better, especially when markets are not functioning, to which Kenny replied, yes it does good work, but it is expensive and inefficient, being tied to US agricultural and shipping suppliers.

A lot has been written about this cash vs food issue, but rarely comparing cash and food within the same programme.

Most recently from IFPRI we have a 2009 report by Akhter Ahmed and others on Bangladesh in the context of a number of transfer programmes in Bangladesh. They explored four transfer programmes in Bangladesh, two of which provide participants with mixes of cash and food. For these two programmes they don't attempt to isolate the relative impacts of food and cash on outcomes, perhaps because it is too difficult to get a clean "identification" of the "treatment" (what is driving the receipt of cash vs food) or perhaps because it is too difficult to match time periods with receipt of each type of transfer. (Interestingly they asked participants what they would prefer and the poorer households preferred food.)

IFPRI is currently engaged with WFP in a 5 country study where cash vs food (and various combinations) will be randomly allocated to communities with a range of impacts being assessed.

It will be interesting to finally get a clean assessment of what cash and food are best for, at least in those contexts. The real issue will be how relevant are these internally valid impacts for other contexts--in other words, how strong is the external validity? For this they will need to conduct more qualitative studies to unlock the black box.

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The Next Development Goals: Never About Us Without Us

Development Horizons from Lawrence Haddad
Together with the excellent Hege Hertzberg from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway, I kicked off the OECD DAC's new Development Debates series, chaired by Jon Lomoy, Director of the Development Cooperation Directorate.

My presentation (with the standard over the top title) can be found here. I argued that while the 2015 expiration date of the MDGs was stimulating a lot of new thinking about what next, new donor action was harder to find.

I went through some of the new thinking needed: being more discerning about growth (not any old kind, thank you); focusing on poor people rather than poor countries (a la Sumner); some of the thinking behind new metrics of human development (the Multidimensional Poverty Index, can wellbeing really be quantified?); rethinking the location of problems and solutions (the poor countries do not have a monopoly on problems, the rich have no monopoly on solutions); framing development cooperation as solidarity as opposed to charity (see my Japan blog last week); and how the next generation of MDGs need to be people-powered, not bureaucrat-built.

My sense is that the relative lack of action is partly because the donors don't want to be distracted from existing commitments (there is a lot of MDG related work remaining to do) and also because they don't want to be seen to be distracted from existing commitments (politicians need all the trust they can get). (There is another alternative—that I am just out of touch.)

But is there another driver of donor hesitancy? Perhaps the donors feel that, unlike last time, they should stand back so the G77 and others can lead.

One good step in this direction is UNDP's initiative to conduct a series of 50 consultations in dozens of countries to try to give the next set of goals a more rounded and grounded feel. But how in touch with grass roots reality can this consultation process be? Will it be held in capitals? And while a broad cross section of people will no doubt be invited, it will be difficult to get beyond the usual suspects (and beyond city limits).

How important is it to engage with people who are fighting for their survival on a daily basis about the commitment they are looking for from others and the commitment they can make to others? It is absolutely vital. If it is not done the next set of goals will lack a certain legitimacy.

What is gained from asking people who are clinging on to life and fragile livelihoods about their poverty? Don't we know what they will say? Well, for legitimacy it is important to be able to say it was done and done genuinely (never about us without us).

But there is another reason--our knowledge and assumptions might well be challenged. One of the audience at the DAC Development Debate mentioned a study that went back to a project intervention site 35 years later to look for evidence of the project's effect. They found a few physical remains of the project, but most importantly they heard first-hand about the transformative effect the project had on the village population and how that played out in a whole range of other dimensions.

The meaning of change is often difficult to see from the outside. That's why there needs to be a series of grassroots consultations on what development goals should aspire to.
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Do you know better than the experts?

Innovations for Poverty Action Blog
Leah Stern

 

At Academy Award parties on Sunday across the country, people filled out sample ballots to guess the Oscar winners before they were announced. Now we're doing the same thing. We've got a new challenge for all you blog readers out there: predict the results of our studies.

IPA recently conducted two studies about whether consulting services and/or cash infusions could help small businesses generate more profit or other positive measures of business success. One study was in Ghana with tailors and seamstresses with only one employee, if any; the other was in Mexico with businesses in a variety of sectors, with an average of 14 employees. The studies tested questions about what – if anything – makes a difference for these firms: is it gaining management skills, gaining the ability to use these skills, or simply gaining money? And is it possible for business owners to gain management skills through short-term consulting? Or perhaps to help the businesses do better, we need to change the environment, which includes elements like economic conditions and regulations. Are these businesses doing the best they can, given their environments?

These are really interesting questions with no clear answers. We can guess, and the principal investigators have some theories about what they think will happen- which is why they're doing these studies.

But we want to know what you think. Dean Karlan, our president, and Annie Duflo, our executive director, published an article in the Stanford Social Innovation Review about the studies and the questions they're attempting to answer, and they're asking you to predict the results of the studies by voting on what you think the answer will be.

Annie and Dean are exploring this idea as a very small step toward a market in predicting the results of randomized trials. Like the markets that predict the winners of the Academy Awards (and hundreds, if not thousands, of other competitions), such a market would hold people accountable for their predictions. As Annie and Dean said in their article, "it's always easy to say, 'I told you so' when there is no clear record of what the predictions were." Secondly, like with markets for other kinds of bets, the wisdom of the crowds can actually help us think about decisions about poverty programs – as they surely helped some people make decisions about their Oscar ballots.

Want to be part of this experiment by predicting the outcome of the two recent IPA studies? Vote now. We'll be back in touch when we have the results – of the voting and of the studies.

Oh, and by the way: randomly chosen winners get a copy of More Than Good Intentions or SSIR for a year.

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Impact and Scale-Up: An Interview with Annie Duflo and Dean Karlan, Part 2

Innovations for Poverty Action Blog
Leah Stern

Last month, Annie Duflo assumed the executive directorship of IPA, replacing Dean Karlan, who will stay on as President. Annie has been with IPA for over three years serving as Vice President and Director of Research. With this shift in leadership, we wanted to sit down with Annie and Dean to hear directly from them about the new organizational structure and what lies ahead as IPA looks toward its tenth anniversary. This excerpt from the larger interview focuses on the origins of IPA and the organization’s scale-up efforts. We posted Annie and Dean’s comments on their goals for the next year in an earlier post.

-----

Interviewer: The origin story about IPA is that Dean joined like-minded researchers with a vision of applying rigorous research methods to really figure out what works in development. As you close in on the 10 year mark, how is IPA today different from what was originally imagined?

Dean: We are doing less scale-up [of proven programs] than was originally intended—I originally envisioned more cases of IPA getting actively involved in direct implementation and scale-up right after a study ends.

And, on a related point, we are doing less work guiding organizations and firms as they build their own internal research departments. I had this image at the beginning that we were going to guide a bunch of banks and larger organizations into creating in-house research practices, where they could take the randomization techniques that we show them and do other tests that are not academically interesting but would be hugely useful to them for program or product design.

The example I remember talking about nine years ago was the Balsakhi remedial education program [which brings teaching assistants to work in small groups with poor performing students]. The academic question was, “Does Balsakhi work?” We know now that it does. But follow-on questions like, “What’s the optimal ratio of students to teaching assistants—should it be four to one; eight to one; twelve to one?” That’s not a question you are going to get many academics excited about spending a year and a half and a couple hundred thousand dollars figuring out. But if you're a large organization running remedial education, you really ought to know the answer. And it's not so hard to set up a test to figure that out.

So we're doing less of that type of research, things that are distinctly non-academic but that are necessary for policy. We should do more, but naturally everything has its tradeoffs, and our resources have not been focused on those types of questions.

Interviewer: So let’s return to the subject of scale-up: Why is IPA doing less scale-up than you originally intended?

Dean: It takes a lot to get to a point where you really do have a clear policy picture. Research moves us, it moves our priors, pushes us towards certain ideas over others, or certain ways of rolling out programs versus others, but it doesn’t always lead to a packaged “do this” answer.

There is also this underlying question of how many times we test something before we feel confident we can go to a new context, evaluate whether the context is appropriate, and then scale it up. This is a question we always struggle with, as we don’t want to oversell any one result, but at the same time we don’t want to stop action from happening until total certainty is reached (nothing will ever be “certain,” naturally). So we are still learning how to make this tradeoff between gathering more evidence and jumping into the fray and working to see evidence change policy.

Last, there is the issue of figuring out IPA’s appropriate role relative to scale-up. What is our comparative advantage? When is a situation right for us to be doing something versus convincing others to take action?

Annie:In order for a proven program to be scaled, one needs to go beyond disseminating research results. Scaling a program requires very different skills from starting a new research project, and it requires a different level of funding. Whether we are working with a government or doing a program in-house, scale-up programs require a huge amount of work before we even start providing services. It's an upfront investment in resources, manpower, and types of skills required.

Interviewer: Annie, you played a leadership role in bringing the Balsakhi remedial education program to Ghana, where IPA is now working with the Ghanaian government to scale it up as the Teacher Community Assistant Initiative (TCAI). What was it about remedial education in particular that showed promise for expanding it there?

Annie: TCAI adapts components of several programs that have been evaluated and that have been shown to be successful [including the Balsakhi remedial education approach tested in India, and the extra teachers tested in Kenya]. So, the underlying concepts of TCAI had been evaluated in different contexts and we were quite confident that the results could be generalized. Of course, the way it’s being done in Ghana is not exactly the same way it was done in India or in Kenya, since the program had to be adapted to the local context. But it was one of the programs where we felt we had enough evidence to go one step further.

Interviewer: IPA has a number of programs that you feel are sufficiently well-proven to bring to scale. In addition to TCAI, there is also school-based deworming and chlorine dispensers for safe water. Is it your opinion that these efforts represent the areas where IPA has had the greatest impact over the past ten years, or do you see things differently?

Dean: They represent the ones for which there's a very clear prescription to make, but the impact of IPA’s research goes well beyond these examples. 

A simple example of impact that may potentially be much bigger is on micro‑credit and the dozens of studies we have done in that space. The outcome of that work has been to say, look, there's nothing wrong with micro‑credit, but microfinance is more than just loans. Microfinance institutions need to be more client-focused, providing the right service at the right time, which may mean savings or insurance, and not just loans. And for the donor, if you're trying to maximize the benefit you generate with a $10 million donation, microcredit is probably not the place to go. For one, investors are happy to fund most microfinance institutions. So let them! Second, ideas beyond mere credit are proving potentially more effective.

Now, the thing with any evaluation that shows a negative result is that it's really hard to say who you're affecting with those results. Take One Laptop Per Child. There were studies conducted, not by IPA, that showed the One Laptop idea was not working (the studies were after about a year, so hardcore believers may argue that longer term results will show a change; but the process changes didn’t seem to appear after a year either, so this seems like a hard case to make). How do we measure the impact of that study? How can you count the dollars that are not donated to something?  

Annie: The impact we are having here is on influencing the debates. As an example, the studies on bed nets showed that charging for bed nets reduced the number of people who used them. Those studies influenced the debate on pricing health products a lot. Being able to shift the debate is very important, and IPA research contributes to that.

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Navigating the New Social Economy

PHILANTHROPY 2173

Toolkit

I'm thrilled to announce that Blueprint 2012 is now a customizable toolkit for use by foundations, nonprofits, or any group seeking to improve their community. Navigating the New Social Economy: Making Sense of Philanthropy's Future presents practical information on the implications of three key issues for our sector - the new social economy, the impact of Citizens United on the social sector, and the potential of big data as a public good. You get the content you need on these three issues as well as the materials to lead strategy discussions about your work in this context.



The Council of Michigan Foundations made this possible - and their staff and members (independent, corporate, and community foundations) have vetted and beta-tested the tools.

The toolkit includes a customizable slide presentation that you can fit to your setting (board meetings, staff retreat, community workshops - you name it.) The slides come with an embedded script as well as a slide-by-slide facilitator's guide. There are suggested discussion questions to use with your colleagues. You also get digital copies of Blueprint 2011 and Blueprint 2012 and an introductory video of me kicking the whole thing off. The toolkit costs $100 and are available formatted specifically for private foundations, community foundations, nonprofits, or associations. It's a one-stop "board retreat in a box" - content, facilitation, and background materials included.

Purchase yours here.
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A Decade of Outcome-Oriented Philanthropy

SSIR Articles

Outcome-oriented philanthropy is at least a century old, but the past 10 or so years have seen an upsurge in both its intensity and its extent. It has been the subject of many articles, talks, and conferences, and has given rise to new organizations dedicated to facilitating its practice. An increasing, albeit still small, number of foundations seem to have adopted an outcome orientation.

"Outcome-oriented" is synonymous with "result-oriented," "strategic," and "effective." It refers to philanthropy where donors seek to achieve clearly defined goals; where they and their grantees pursue evidence-based strategies for achieving those goals; and where both parties monitor progress toward outcomes and assess their success in achieving them in order to make appropriate course corrections.

This approach can take different forms. A classic example from many decades ago was the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations' funding of research and development to improve agricultural production in developing countries—what became known as the Green Revolution. More recent examples include the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's efforts to build the field of digital media and learning, and Acumen Fund's and Omidyar Network's "impact investments" to benefit the world's poorest people.

The common theme of these approaches, the idea that philanthropy should seek results, may seem so obvious as to make the modifier "outcome-oriented" superfluous. But despite the increasing belief that the work of the sector should rest on goal-oriented, evidence-based strategies, very few donors actually follow these principles.

I caught the start of the wave of outcome-oriented philanthropy when I joined the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation as president in 2000, and it's been a great ride. As I prepare to leave the foundation, I'd like to reflect on the currents that have brought outcome-oriented philanthropy this far, and the shoals and reefs that lie ahead.

Stirrings of a Movement

Before focusing on the particular practices of outcome-oriented philanthropy, I'll begin with a word about its infrastructure. The last decade opened with two important articles that provided the underpinnings of outcome-oriented philanthropy: Christine Letts, William Ryan, and Allen Grossman's Virtuous Capital: What Foundations Can Learn from Venture Capitalists, and Michael Porter and Mark Kramer's Philanthropy's New Agenda: Creating Value. These were followed by an unprecedented amount of research, teaching, and writing on the subject, as well as the launch of the Stanford Social Innovation Review and The Foundation Review, blogs such as Sean Stannard-Stockton's Tactical Philanthropy, and new academic research centers at Stanford, Duke, and the University of Pennsylvania.

What practical assistance is available to outcome-oriented philanthropists? Although older membership organizations such as the Council on Foundations, Philanthropy Roundtable, the National Center for Family Philanthropy, Independent Sector, and the regional associations of grantmakers have increased their programming in this respect, strategy is not (yet) embedded in their DNA. But two important new organizations have entered the field. The mission of the Center for Effective Philanthropy is to improve foundations' abilities to achieve social impact. As its name implies, Grantmakers for Effective Organizations' guiding tenet is that strong nonprofit organizations are necessary for achieving outcomes.

The number and quality of consulting firms providing donors with management and strategic advice have increased dramatically during the past decade. Among the new entrants are the Bridgespan Groupand FSG, which provide strategic consulting to organizations. Firms like Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors and Arabella Philanthropic Investment Advisors provide services to individual donors as well.

Like strategic consultants, good evaluation shops have been around for some time. But new organizations have emerged to meet new demands. Among the signal developments of the past decade was the creation of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which has brought the highest standards of social science to assess interventions in developing countries.

Beginning with Philanthropy Workshop and its offshoot, the Philanthropy Workshop West, the decade saw an increase in the number and quality of outcome-oriented donor education programs available to high net worth philanthropists. The Donor Effectiveness Network is establishing common outcome-oriented standards among a broader group of donor education providers.

The Internet has enabled advances in communication among funders, grantees, and others. The Foundation Center's Glasspocketsinitiative is inducing greater foundation transparency. And many foundations receive feedback from grantees through the Center for Effective Philanthropy's Grantee Perception Reports.

A growing number of independent groups use the Internet to publish information about the impact of nonprofits. GiveWell and Root Causeprovide in-depth analyses of nonprofits. Philanthropedia (recently acquired by GuideStar) aggregates experts' opinions of organizations as a proxy for their effectiveness and outcomes. Charity Navigator, once exclusively focused on financial data unrelated to outcomes, is beginning to develop outcome indicators. And the Charting Impact project of Independent Sector, GuideStar, and the Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance is encouraging nonprofits to publish structured information about their goals, strategies, and achievements.

Finally, more than a dozen recent books, by authors including Laura Arrillaga-Andreessen, Joel Fleishman, and Tom Tierney advocate an outcome-oriented approach. No less important, the movement has inspired some strong critics, including William Schambra and Bruce Sievers, who argue against the practice, or at least its inclination toward measurable outcomes.

Approaches to Outcome-Oriented Philanthropy

For all the new organizations, services, and advocates of outcome-oriented philanthropy, the important question is the extent to which it has taken root in practice. Outcome-oriented philanthropy has two major focal points: supporting organizations and problem-solving philanthropy.1 Examples of supporting organizations range from grants to after-school programs for underserved children and gifts to universities to create, teach, and disseminate knowledge, to investments in for-profit entities distributing malaria bed nets. There are three different strategies for supporting organizations: philanthropic buying, providing risk and growth capital, and impact investing.

Outcome-oriented philanthropic buyers look for the best service in their areas of interest for the lowest cost, and make gifts and grants to help pay the operating costs of nonprofits providing those services. Philanthropic investors provide risk capital to social entrepreneurs and nascent organizations, or growth capital to enable relatively mature organizations to expand the scope, efficiency, and quality of their work. Impact investors seek the double or triple bottom line objectives of achieving social or environmental impact as well as financial returns. Their investments may buy services or provide risk or growth capital with the aims of, say, improving the lives of the poor through microfinance or reducing energy consumption by investing in clean tech startups, while earning financial returns.

The second major type of outcome-oriented philanthropy is problem-solving philanthropy. Whereas philanthropists often buy services and support organizations in order to solve problems, problem-solving philanthropists put the problem rather than the organization at the center, and actively engage with their grantees in designing and implementing strategies. Here philanthropists act as architects, general contractors, or engineers, and their work often verges on the operational. As a practical matter, only a foundation staffed with experts in a field can undertake this work. During the past decade, foundations played increasingly active and visible problem-solving roles by building fields, brokering collaborative arrangements, and supporting systems change and advocacy.

Supporting Organizations

Philanthropic Buying | Of the three strategies for supporting organizations, philanthropic buying accounts for the vast majority of contributions, and it is also the area where outcome-oriented philanthropy has shown the least gains. A recent survey indicates that although 21 percent of donors inquire into performance, only 3 percent actually use the information to determine which organizations to support.2 This may be partly explained by the challenges of obtaining adequate information about nonprofits' performance. Despite the third-party ratings groups mentioned above, there is nothing approaching the comprehensiveness of, say, Consumer Reports. As a result, philanthropic buyers must often do their own due diligence, which requires knowledge of the substantive area and detailed information about a particular organization's goals, strategies, and actual outcomes. Staffed foundations are relatively well equipped to acquire this information. Other foundations and high net worth individuals must rely on consulting firms or else follow the lead of staffed foundations in which they have confidence—a practice that has not yet gained much adherence.

Apart from these difficulties, many philanthropic buyers subvert their contributions by earmarking donations for particular projects rather than providing unrestricted general operating support. Even outcome-oriented buyers impose these restrictions, often in the misguided beliefs that general operating support grants cannot be evaluated and that donors can have more impact by designating funds for programs. A decade-plus of advocacy by Independent Sector, Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, and the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy seems to have made minimal gains.

Providing Risk and Growth Capital | Well before the current decade, philanthropists supported social entrepreneurs' early-stage ventures through organizations such as Ashoka and Echoing Green. Although the interest in social entrepreneurship has grown, the sector is still lacking in patient capital to build, sustain, and grow promising nonprofit organizations—for example, funding to pay for new computer systems or train staff members.

One particular area of need is funding to allow successful enterprises to operate at a larger scale. The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation (EMCF) does this by helping build the capacity of promising youth services organizations, and by aggregating capital toward this end. In 2007, EMCF launched the Growth Capital Aggregation Pilot that has raised $120 million for Citizen Schools, Nurse-Family Partnership, and Youth Villages.

Philanthropic investors must perform the same tasks as philanthropic buyers—and then some. They must assess organizations' capacities, needs, and potential for growth and sustainability; understand how to replicate successful model programs; and provide capacity-building support, directly or through consultants, in areas including strategic planning, management, evaluation, governance, fundraising, and communications. As with philanthropic buying, these activities call for experienced foundation staff members. Individual donors and unstaffed foundations have the option of investing in a fund managed by an organization like EMCF.

Impact Investing | The idea that markets can be important vehicles for creating social impact was recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as early as 1969 in its favorable treatment of program- related investments—typically investments that have a lower market-adjusted return than ordinary investments. This paved the way for impact investing some 30 years later.

Impact investors invest capital or make loans to business or nonprofit entities with the goal of achieving social, environmental, and financial returns. In addition to affirmative investment strategies, an increasing number of foundations engage in "socially responsible investing" by voting proxies on issues of social concern or using negative screens to avoid investing in companies that they believe cause social harm.

The tax code creates a divide between investments that seek financial and social returns. By doing much of its work outside of a 501(c)(3) charter, the Omidyar Network makes both for-profit and nonprofit investments to achieve social impact. And two new legal forms of organizations have emerged to blend financial and social outcomes: the low-profit limited liability company (L3C), and the benefit, or B corporation, whose charter requires the company to adhere to socially beneficial practices. (It remains to be seen whether these boundary-crossing approaches increase social benefits or subordinate social benefits to profit motives.)

In addition to needing the skills of philanthropic buyers and investors, impact investors need the financial acumen to identify and analyze investment opportunities that promote the foundation's goals at whatever financial return and risk level fit their social and financial parameters. This requires marrying the knowledge of a foundation's program officers with the skills of its investment staff. Program-related investments typically require legal expertise as well. Donors who lack the staff to perform these activities in-house can turn to the increasing number of consultants in this area, such as Imprint Capital Advisors, Arabella Philanthropic Investment Advisors, and Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors.

As with all philanthropic giving, the main challenge of impact investing is to assess the social impact of one's investment decisions. The issue is most apparent for impact investing that seeks to achieve market rate returns at market risk levels: If clean tech is just as attractive to investors just out to make a buck, will a mission-related investment in clean tech make even a slight additional difference in improving the environment? (Similar questions can be asked about negative screens for investing in publicly traded stocks.) As tools are developed to measure the "blended value" of impact investing, they may ultimately benefit all outcome-oriented philanthropy.

Problem Solving Philanthropy

Problem-solving philanthropy focuses on solving social, environmental, or other problems rather than supporting individual nonprofits as such. This approach is essential when a field lacks strong organizations whose missions and activities are closely aligned with a funder's goals—which may happen if the funder's goals are novel or not mainstream, or if the field is new or is not well developed. But even in a fairly mature field, organizations are often disconnected and competitive with one another at the expense of transparency and collaboration, and lack the capacity or will to act in coordination to solve multifaceted problems. In short, the whole sometimes is less than the sum of its parts.

In these situations, the problem-solving philanthropist plays a coordinating role, drawing on the resources of various organizations and linking them with each other and with experts, policy makers, and practitioners. Problem-solving philanthropists use all available philanthropic tools, including investing and buying, to achieve particular goals. With expertise in the field, they often possess a perspective that no single organization does. Like philanthropic buyers and investors, problem-solving philanthropists often help grantees improve their organizational effectiveness, but they typically go beyond this role to be partners in strategic planning and implementation.

Here are several vignettes of different types of problem-solving philanthropy from the Hewlett Foundation's work as well as one in which we were not involved.

Building Fields | For decades, international donors' support for primary and secondary education in developing countries focused on expanding access to schools without attention to learning outcomes. In 2001, the Hewlett Foundation began to try to improve outcomes in reading, math, and problem-solving skills. Because few existing organizations were closely aligned with this goal, the foundation had to draw on diverse entities to put together a strategy. For example, the foundation made grants to the Center for Universal Education for research on quality education in developing countries. It made grants to the Aga Khan Foundation to develop a more effective approach to teaching reading and math, and then to implement the approach in Kenya and Uganda. And it engaged the African Population and Health Research Center to assess whether these approaches actually worked. Over time, the foundation hopes to foster the development of in-country organizations to which it and others can make general operating support grants. But for now, the work continues to require considerable engagement by foundation staff.

Brokering | Hewlett Foundation staff played a major role in assisting with the transfer of the Stanford Social Innovation Review from the Stanford Graduate School of Business (whose priorities no longer included the journal) to Stanford University's Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society, and gaining financial support for the enterprise. The foundation also facilitated the acquisition of Philanthropedia by GuideStar and the formation of a strategic alliance among Independent Sector, the Wise Giving Alliance, and GuideStar to create Charting Impact, a framework for organizations to describe their goals, strategies, and outcome measures.

Collaboration and Linking Organizations | The Hewlett, Moore, Packard, TOSA, and Wilburforce foundations and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund collaborated to protect about 21 million acres of largely undeveloped coastal land in the Great Bear Rainforest in British Columbia, Canada. The foundations' staffs brought together conservation grantees with the provincial and Canadian governments, First Nations tribes, and the timber industry—interests that had fought one another for years. The foundations saw an opportunity to facilitate negotiations among these parties to protect the forest, deliver economic development opportunities to coastal First Nations, and put the timber industry on a path toward sustainability. In the process, the foundations created the Rainforest Solutions Project to put together an environmental deal among nonprofits and supported similar partnerships among the First Nations people and private sector companies.

Policy Advocacy | The Hewlett Foundation's Environment Program has made grants to a variety of organizations to advance climate change and air quality policies in California. Traditional environmental groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense Fund have provided critical advocacy and analytical capacity to help develop California's climate change policies, which ultimately can have a large effect on private investments as well as public resources. On the local and regional level, public health, environmental justice, and community groups like the Fresno-Madera Medical Society, the Coalition for Clean Air, Communities for a Better Environment, and the East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice have achieved significant improvements in air quality.

Collective Impact | Foundations have sometimes played a role in multi-stakeholder collaborative efforts. In the article "Collective Impact," in the winter 2011 issue of the Stanford Social Innovation Review, John Kania and Mark Kramer write that "large-scale social change comes from better cross-sector collaboration rather than from the isolated intervention of individual organizations." Their poster child is Strive, a project in which foundations, nonprofit organizations, corporations, school district leaders, and universities have collaborated to address the problem of low student achievement in Cincinnati, and created an intermediary organization to coordinate their efforts.

In addition to calling for all the skills involved in supporting organizations, problem-solving philanthropy requires understanding the dynamics of complex social and political systems; developing sound strategies that take both benefits and risks of failure into account; helping develop strategies, and monitoring and evaluation plans; and linking nonprofit organizations, funders, experts, and policymakers. It also calls for the resilience to abide both great uncertainties and great failures.

Criticisms of Outcome-Oriented Philanthropy

Outcome-oriented philanthropy—particularly the problem-solving approach—has been subject to various criticisms. Some critics embrace the practice and seek to improve it, and others challenge the very concept. I'll begin by mentioning an argument between the two main outcome-oriented schools. Some proponents of problem-solving philanthropy imply that (merely) supporting organizations is not an impactful use of philanthropic dollars. Indeed, the frequent characterization of problem-solving philanthropy as "strategic" might be taken to imply that supporting organizations is unstrategic. On the other side, some commentators accord general operating support an almost religious status, and denigrate problem-solving philanthropy as inherently top-down and inimical to the autonomy and vitality of nonprofits. Stannard-Stockton takes this position in his usually excellent blog. My view is that both approaches have great potential, but that their true value depends on their actual outcomes.

These internecine squabbles aside, internal critics of outcome-oriented philanthropy voice the concerns that it can be incompetently executed, and that funders may exercise inappropriate control over grantees, thereby impinging on their autonomy and stifling innovation. For example, in their 2011 article in The Foundation Review, "Beyond the Veneer of Strategic Philanthropy," Patricia Patrizi and Elizabeth Thompson note that, after engaging in a lengthy strategic planning process, some foundations put their plans in a drawer and do not engage in the ongoing monitoring and evaluation that would inform necessary corrections. They also observe that foundations often don't consider in advance the tasks that their staffs must perform to design and implement a strategy, and that staff members may lack the requisite skills.

Some of Patrizi and Thompson's points resonate with the Hewlett Foundation's experience over the past decade. Early on, we mouthed the concepts of outcome-oriented philanthropy and asked grantees to do likewise, without fully understanding how the concepts played out in practice. Though we always treated strategic plans as living documents, it is only in the last several years that we have engaged in the systematic monitoring and evaluation necessary to see if strategies are working, and correct them when they're not. We have also learned through painful experiences about the challenges of implementing even well-thought-out strategies. The Hewlett Foundation's support for strengthening grantees' capacities has grown year by year. And our understanding of the tasks performed by program officers, the skills needed, and the implications for hiring, support, and training also has grown tremendously.

Patrizi and Thompson note that some foundations treat grantees merely as agents for implementing strategies designed in-house, rather than as partners in their design, leading to weak strategies, limited buy-in by grantees, and poor feedback. In "Letting Go," an article in the spring 2011 issue of the Stanford Social Innovation Review, Kristi Kimball and Malka Kopell levy the similar criticism that foundations are prone to the "not invented here" syndrome in adopting strategies and their underlying theories of change.

The critics' basic concern is legitimate. Workable theories of change cannot be developed by foundation staff alone, but only through extensive and ongoing consultations with grantees, practitioners, experts, policymakers, and others. But in their zeal to prevent the not-invented-here error, Kimball and Kopell adopt the mirror-image error of demanding that "it must be invented there," where "there" is a grantee. This fundamentally mistakes the way knowledge develops. It is seldom possible to trace the origins of ideas to one or another institution. As ideas are tested, refined, mixed with others, or discarded, they don't belong to any particular organization but instead enter the public domain.

Kimball and Kopell also complain that a given foundation typically funds interventions based on only one or two theories of change, rather than supporting a diverse group of promising ideas. But although supporting a number of ideas may sound good in theory, most foundations lack the financial and human resources to pursue more than a couple at any time.

In contrast to the preceding critics who want to improve outcome- oriented philanthropy, others question its core tenets. These include both conservatives like William Schambra and liberals like Bruce Sievers and Bill Somerville, whose positions sometimes converge and sometimes diverge. The critics share a radical skepticism about social science as well as the belief that an emphasis on metrics leads philanthropists to focus on measurable results at the expense of outcomes that are truly important. The conservative critics, following the political theorist Edmund Burke, argue that efforts at broad-scale social change are fraught with uncertainty and unanticipated bad consequences. They would have philanthropy support local community organizations without demanding particular outcomes. The liberals share this emphasis on local communities, but they also extol philanthropy's big bets on social movements, whether involving the environment or civil rights—again, without the constraints of specific outcomes and metrics.

Of course, there is good reason for caution in acting on social science findings. But the implication that we can never make good bets on social interventions is demonstrably false; it isn't the way we live our own lives when we make decisions, say, about what kind of education to provide our children. For all of the complexities of evaluating social interventions and assessing whether they can be generalized to different settings, we sometimes know "what works" and what doesn't. Indeed, the past decade saw the emergence of organizations that attempt to answer these questions at a granular level.3

The concern that an obsession with metrics may limit a philanthropist's ambition or scope is legitimate. My own view is that one should first choose goals and then make a serious effort to define measurable targets or reasonable proxies for them. Our experience at the Hewlett Foundation is that this usually takes us pretty far, but that sometimes we must make do with qualitative indicators of progress that fall far short of ultimate outcomes. Statistical analysis can provide a reasonable picture of the success of a de-worming program in Africa. But broad-scale social movements require long time horizons and patience with setbacks and periods of stasis.

Sievers argues that philanthropy should focus primarily on empowering civil society. Doubtless, this is a valuable goal, but so too are curing cancer and reducing poverty. Certainly the engagement of citizens is often an important means of achieving philanthropic goals as well as an end in itself. But not always. The proposition that philanthropy must devote itself to particular goals has surfaced in every decade. Rather than choose among the myriad possible candidates, I would prefer to continue the rich tradition of diverse ends and means that has characterized American philanthropy.

The Coming Decade

The decade ends with healthy debates on these issues in journals and blogs that did not exist at its inception, and with many of the institutions and practices mentioned in the preceding pages flourishing. It also ends with considerable interest in the use of social media to improve impact, and in crowdsourcing, design thinking, and other approaches to developing innovative ideas—though, unfortunately, less enthusiasm for scaling successful strategies.

Some of the most interesting innovations have involved nonprofit financing, including "pay-for-performance" schemes, in which funders pay grantee organizations only if they achieve agreed-upon outcome targets. There has been some experimentation with social impact bonds, which combine pay-for-performance with financial markets to scale up successful strategies. For example, in 2010, the United Kingdom offered £5 million of bonds to fund interventions by organizations with proven records of reducing recidivism among prisoners. The bondholders, who take greater than market risks, are repaid only if the organizations achieve certain milestones.

For all of the improved practices and new ideas of the past decade, philanthropy remains an underperformer in achieving social outcomes. One cause of this may be that philanthropists are essentially unaccountable. Businesses have shareholders, politicians have constituents, and nonprofits have funders. In contrast, philanthropists are spending their own money subject to only minimal constraints on their judgment. Of course, foundations have boards, but the boards are often themselves the primary decision makers and, in any event, are not externally accountable. In theory, the media can play a watchdog role. But even if they had the data and capacity necessary to monitor outcomes, their audiences tend to be more interested in personal anecdotes, especially tales of malfeasance.

Despite these shortcomings, I cannot think of a system of external accountability with bite that would not threaten the valuable diversity of American philanthropy—especially its ability to experiment and take risks. A more promising approach would center on self-imposed philanthropic transparency, which could provide donors with feedback that would inform their practices as well as improve sector-wide knowledge. As a starting point, foundations might hold themselves to the minimal Charting Impact disclosures about goals, strategies, and the like.

It is not surprising that donors who are unconcerned with improving their own practices are not interested in improving the practice of philanthropy more broadly. One consequence, however, is the continued weakness of many of the national membership organizations, regional associations of grantmakers, and community foundations on which small foundations and high net worth donors rely for philanthropic guidance. Perhaps because supporting the field seems self-indulgent, or because its benefits are indirect, abstract, and long term, some of the promising new organizations are underfunded.

Despite these problems, outcome-oriented philanthropy continues to have momentum. If there's still more talk than action, talk often precedes action. With many new large foundations likely to come into being during the coming decade, there is a great opportunity to increase the sector's impact. But for outcome-oriented philanthropy to take root will ultimately require a change in the mindset of high net worth donors about what it means to be a good philanthropist—perhaps no less ambitious a transformation than that achieved by the 40-year effort of conservative foundations to change citizens' views of government or of the current movement to broaden the meaning of marriage.

I would like to thank Matt Bannick, Jeff Bradach, Phil Buchanan, Jacob Harold, Brent Harris, C.R. Hibbs, Kristi Kimball, Mark Kramer, Karen Lindblom, Edward Skloot, Sean Stannard-Stockton, Fay Twersky, and Iris Brest for their comments on earlier versions of this article.


Further Reading

Recent books advocating an outcome-oriented approach to philanthropy include:

Joel Fleishman, The Foundation: A Great American Secret; How Private Wealth is Changing the World (2007)

Paul Brest and Hal Harvey, Money Well Spent: A Strategic Plan for Smart Philanthropy (2008)

Matthew Bishop and Michael Green, Philanthrocapitalism: How Giving Can Save the World (2009)

Tom Tierney and Joel Fleishman, Give Smart: Philanthropy that Gets Results (2011)

Leslie Crutchfield, John Kania, and Mark Kramer, Do More Than Give: The Six Practices of Donors Who Change the World (2011)

Mario Morino, Leap of Reason: Managing to Outcomes in an Era of Scarcity (2011)

Antony Bugg-Levine and Jed Emerson, Impact Investing: Transforming How We Make Money While Making a Difference (2011)

Laura Arrillaga, Giving 2.0 (2011)

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